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PROFITS AND PRINCIPLES: PROMOTING
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY BY AMENDING THE ALIEN
TORT CLAIMS ACT
Brad J. Kieserman
In today's fast-moving global economy, new and profitable investment
opportunities increasingly arise in some of the world's most destitute na-
tions.' Regrettably, "capital follows the promise of high returns" and is
2often heedless of human rights records. Thus, U.S. multinational corpo-
rations3 (MNCs) in search of lower costs and increased profits often forge
'J.D. Candidate, May 2000, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law
1. See PETER MARBER, FROM THIRD WORLD TO WORLD CLASS: THE FUTURE OF
EMERGING MARKETS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 87-104 (1998) (analyzing the develop-
ment of corporate economic opportunities in emerging nations); see also DAVID C.
KORTEN, WHEN CORPORATIONS RULE THE WORLD 229-37 (1995) (characterizing the
recent increase in competitive global capitalism as a "race to the bottom" because "[s]ocial
responsibility is inefficient in a global free market").
2. MARBER, supra note 1, at 217. But cf Martha M. Hamilton, Shell's New World
View: At Helm of Oil Titan, Moody-Stuart Sees Profit in Principles, WASH. POST, Aug. 2,
1998, at H1. In 1998, Royal Dutch/Shell Group, the world's largest publicly traded oil
company, published a new statement of principles asserting its commitment to sustainable
development and "fundamental human rights in line with the legitimate role of business."
Id. While the purpose of business has typically been generating society's wealth, corpora-
tions may have a broader and more varied role to play in today's globalized community.
See id. For this reason, Shell is reshaping its view of corporate social responsibility. See id.
Some observers assert, however, that Shell's rhetoric is merely a public relations campaign
designed in response to worldwide criticism of the corporation's abysmal record of accom-
plishment on human rights and environmental issues in Nigeria. See David A. Love, Edi-
torial, A New Leaf in Nigeria?, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 1998, at A17; see also Editorial,
Remember Shell, Boycott Shell, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, Dec. 1997, at 5 (asserting
that Shell failed to change its policies in Nigeria, even in the face of world-wide condemna-
tion); Corporations and Human Rights (visited Oct. 18, 1998) <http://www.hrw.org/hrw/
about/initiatives/corp.html> (accusing Shell of intransigence because the corporation in-
creased financial investment and defensive public relations on behalf of the Nigerian gov-
ernment following activist Ken Saro-Wiwa's execution). For a discussion of Shell's role in
the Saro-Wiwa execution, see infra note 5 and Part II.E.1.
3. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1015-16 (6th ed. 1990) (defining a multinational
corporation as "a firm which has centers of operation in many countries" or "which does
business in many countries but is based in only one country"). This Comment does not
distinguish between multinational and transnational corporate structures. Multinational
corporations tend to maintain strong national identities, while transnational corporations
endeavor to do away with considerations of nationality by developing vertically integrated
supplier networks with inter-linked global operations. See KORTEN, supra note 1, at 125.
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economic alliances with some of the "most barbarous and illegitimate re-
gimes on earth.",4 Contending that they cannot interfere with the local
conflicts and internal politics of foreign nations, MNCs claim they are not
responsible for the abusive conduct of their foreign host-governments.5
Today, however, MNCs are nearly "alone in possessing the size, tech-
nology, and economic reach necessary to influence human affairs on a
global basis."6 Notwithstanding the international legal status of nations,'
MNCs often have more control over human, natural, and financial re-
sources than do the sovereigns that supposedly regulate them.' For ex-
ample, the limited extraterritorial application of U.S. law permits capital-
hungry host countries to entice U.S. corporations by offering settings
nearly free of labor, safety, and environmental regulations.9 Corpora-
tions choosing to operate in those countries are free, therefore, to engage
in profitable practices that would be illegal if carried out in the United
States.'0 MNCs are further able to evade accountability for abusive over-
seas investment activities because international law traditionally focuses
4. John Vidal, A Dirty Business Bogged Down in a Moral and Political Mire,
GUARDIAN, Aug. 15, 1998, at 5.
5. See id.; see also Andy Rowell, Shell Shocked: Did the Shell Petroleum Company
Silence Nigerian Environmentalist Ken Saro-Wiwa?, VILLAGE VOICE, Nov. 21, 1995, at 20.
Shell claimed that it could not get involved in the affairs of a sovereign state and refused
to exercise its influence over the Nigerian military junta to prevent the execution of activ-
ist Ken Saro-Wiwa. See id. Shell later admitted, however, to paying members of the Nige-
rian army, including a Lieutenant Colonel implicated in the torture and trial of Saro-
Wiwa. See Andrew Rowell, Shell Cracks: Petroleum Company Acknowledges Payments to
Nigeria's Murderous Military, VILLAGE VOICE, Dec. 17, 1996, at 30.
6. THOMAS DONALDSON, THE ETHICS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 31 (1989)
(arguing that the enhanced character of multinational corporate power contributes to
ethical controversies in global operations).
7. See generally LOUIS HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN
POLICY 13-28 (1968) (analyzing the significance and limitations of law in international re-
lations). Professor Henkin asserts that "[ejxcept as limited by international law or treaty,
a nation is master in its own territory." Id. at 18.
8. See Claudio Grossman & Daniel D. Bradlow, Are We Being Propelled Towards a
People-Centered Transnational Legal Order?, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 8-9 (1993)
(discussing significant problems for traditional international law arising from the growth of
modern corporate power).
9. See generally Mark Gibney & R. David Emerick, The Extraterritorial Application
of United States Law and the Protection of Human Rights: Holding Multinational Corpora-
tions to Domestic and International Standards, 10 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 123 (1996)
(discussing anomalies and inconsistencies in the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws
and arguing that domestic law should bind U.S.-based corporate operations overseas).
10. See id. at 124-25, 139, 144 (noting that corporations may "lose some of their com-
petitive advantage" if Congress gave extraterritorial effect to domestic health, safety, envi-
ronmental, and labor laws).
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on relations between states, not private actors." As a result of the ab-
sence of internationally enforceable environmental and labor standards,
the relationship between the host-state and foreign investors in emerging
nations is essentially unregulated.12 Thus, some commentators observe
that MNCs "have grown beyond the control of national governments and
operate in a legal and moral vacuum." 3
Unfortunately, the nexus between sustainable development and hu-
man rights is emerging only slowly and grudgingly as a priority for global
corporate management.1 4 There is no comprehensive mandatory interna-
tional code of corporate conduct targeting human rights practices.1 5 In-
11. Cf MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 230-31 (2d
ed., Aspen Law & Bus. 1993). Professor Janis reports that in its earliest inception the law
of nations applied to both individuals and states. See id. at 227-28. Jeremy Bentham
coined the term "international law" in his influential 1789 treatise, Introduction to the
Principles of Morals and Legislation. See id. at 228 (citing J. BENTHAM, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (Burns and Hart
eds., 1970). Although Bentham stated that he was merely giving a new name to the law of
nations, he actually redefined the scope of the law to deal "exclusively [with] the rights
and obligations of states inter se and never [with] the rights and obligations of individuals."
Id. at 230-31 (same). This Comment uses the terms "international law" and "law of na-
tions" interchangeably.
12. See Gibney & Emerick, supra note 9, at 123-25.
13. Robert J. Fowler, International Environmental Standards for Transnational Cor-
porations, 25 ENVTL. L. 1, 2 (1995).
14. See Frank Vogl, More and More, Industries Must Incorporate Social Issues in
Management for Success (visited Aug. 19, 1998) <http://www.earthtimes.org/aug/
businessethicsmoreandmoreaug7_98.htm> (on file with the Catholic University Law Re-
view).
15. See Barbara A. Frey, The Legal and Ethical Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations in the Protection of International Human Rights, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
153, 159 (1997). Professor Frey describes corporate responsibility for human rights as an
"emerging continuum" shaped by "the relationship between the [MNC's] activities in a
country, and the degree to which human rights are respected in that country." Id. at 154.
She divides corporate self-regulation, through codes of conduct, into three types: 1) ven-
dor standards regarding forced, child, and convict labor, 2) standards targeting support for
civil and political rights, and 3) investment criteria. See id. at 177-80. While finding the
existing corporate codes of conduct "grossly inadequate," Professor Frey argues that
"[e]xisting standards reflect that corporations believe the further removed they are from
human rights abuse, the lesser their degree of responsibility to act." Id. at 154, 180.
Therefore, Professor Frey classifies corporate entanglements in human rights violations as
1) direct active involvement, 2) passive involvement where the corporation benefits from
governmental abuses it is capable of preventing, 3) intervention in situations for which the
company is not responsible but in which it may effectively assert influence, and 4) aware-
ness that host countries are pervasively violating human rights but that these violations are
unrelated to the MNC's operations. See id. at 180-87. This Comment envisions ATCA
liability for the first two classifications encompassing direct and passive involvement in
human rights violations. Cf infra Part II.D (comparing the contours of corporate liability
in recent ATCA cases).
Voluntary corporate codes, if adhered to, provide an alternative to giving domestic law
19991
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ternational efforts to hold MNCs accountable have been limited to non-
binding aspirational codes that are ineffective in the face of collusion be-
tween host-governments and MNCs who condone each other's sub-
standard treatment of workers and the environment.16 Regional efforts
to link trade initiatives with human rights have been similarly unsuccess-
ful." Likewise, domestic congressional sanctions restricting corporate in-
vestment in foreign nations with poor human rights records have been
extraterritorial effect or legislating standards of conduct for multinational operations. For
an excellent survey of voluntary corporate codes of conduct, see Leslie Wells, Note, A
Wolf in Sheep's Clothing: Why Unocal Should Be Liable Under U.S. Law For Human
Rights Abuses in Burma, 32 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 35 (forthcoming Spring 1999)
(manuscript at 38-44, on file with the Catholic University Law Review). For a review of
recent initiatives in the area of voluntary corporate codes, see Corporations and Human
Rights, supra note 2. Human Rights Watch observes that, while there is a growing interest
in human rights among consumer-sensitive clothing and footwear companies, simple pro-
nouncements of corporate codes of conduct have neither ended the most egregious abuses
nor significantly improved corporate attitudes toward independent monitoring of human
rights practices. See id.
16. See Frey, supra note 15, at 165-67 (tracing the history, and ultimate collapse, of
negotiations related to the United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corpora-
tions); see also Development and International Economic Co-operation: Transnational
Corporations, UN Doc. E/1990/94 (letter from the Chairman of the reconvened special
session of the Commission on Transnational Corporations to the President of U.N.
ESCOR and annex proposing a code of conduct for transnational corporations that was
never adopted); cf. Kofi A. Annan, Editorial, An Appeal to World Business, BOSTON
GLOBE, Feb. 1, 1999, at A15. United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan urged busi-
nesses "not... to wait until every country has introduced" progressive labor laws and en-
vironmental standards before implementing responsible corporate practices in developing
countries. Id. Instead, Annan challenged MNCs to use their considerable influence with
emerging nations to advance human rights, labor, "and environmental standards by their
own conduct of business," and to avoid, particularly, complicity in human rights abuses.
Id. In the on-line version (but not in the print edition) of his editorial, Annan observed
further that "the private sector's influence is much greater than [the United Nations' in-
fluence in promoting global values] because the prosperity of a country can depend on its
investment decisions." Kofi Annan, An Appeal to World Business, BOSTON GLOBE, (Feb.
1, 1999) <http://www.boston.com/dailyglobe2/O32/oped/An-appeal-to worldbusiness
+.shtml> (on file with the Catholic University Law Review).
17. See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE
REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER, 192-98, 226-29 (1996) (discussing the inability of Western
nations to pursue their political and human rights agendas among Eastern nations).
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• 18 • 1limited to only a few countries and criticized as counter-productive."
Consequently, human rights advocates turned recently to federal civil
litigation in an effort to exert legal pressure on U.S.-based MNCs doing
business with some of the world's most brutal governments. z Insisting
18. See, e.g., Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat.
1541 (imposing sanctions on persons exporting certain goods or technology that would en-
hance Iran's ability to explore for, extract, refine, or transport by pipeline petroleum re-
sources in an effort "to deny Iran the ability to support acts of international terrorism");
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-114,
110 Stat. 785 (seeking the downfall of Fidel Castro's communist government and to facili-
tate transition to a democratically elected government by deterring foreign investment in
Cuba); Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, 100 Stat. 1086
(sanctioning apartheid by prohibiting loans, investments, and certain other activities with
respect to South Africa).
19. See John Imle, Editorial, Keep Door Open In Myanmar, J. CoM., Feb. 28,1997, at
6A (arguing that unilateral economic sanctions have historically harmed the people of tar-
geted countries without having a significant impact on their governments or leaders). Mr.
Imle is the President of the Los Angeles based Unocal Corporation. See id. Part II of this
Comment discusses Unocal's entanglement with human rights violations in Burma. See
also Chevron Chairman Calls for Major Reforms to U.S. Economic-Sanctions Policy at
National Foreign Trade Council Forum (Nov. 6, 1998) <http://usaengage.org/news/
981106pr.html> (reporting on Chevron corporation chairman Ken Derr's views that sanc-
tions damage domestic job creation and international relations). American politicians
have used sanctions as domestic political fodder. See, e.g., Michael Gillis, Nigerians Pro-
vide Fitzgerald a Boost, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Oct. 30, 1998, at 6. Gillis reports that Caucasian
Republican Senate candidate Peter Fitzgerald criticized his African-American Democratic
incumbent opponent, Senator Carol Moseley-Braun, for her opposition to sanctions
against Nigeria. See id. Fitzgerald brought the son of executed Nigerian activist Ken
Saro-Wiwa to America to criticize Moseley-Braun several days before congressional elec-
tions. See id. Moreover, the Nigerian-American Political Action Committee endorsed
Fitzgerald, rather than Moseley-Braun, solely because of his views on sanctions against the
Nigerian military regime. See id.
20. See infra Part II (discussing recent corporate ATCA cases). See, e.g., Wiwa v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 Civ. 8386, slip op. at 2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 25, 1998) (al-
leging complicity between Royal Dutch Shell Corporation and the Nigerian Government
in the execution of activist Ken Saro-Wiwa and other violent acts against members of the
Ogoni tribe); National Coalition Gov't of the Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D.
329 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (alleging complicity between Unocal and the military government of
Burma in perpetrating torture, forced labor, and slavery); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan,
Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La. 1997) (alleging complicity between Freeport-McMoRan
Corporation and the Indonesian Government in perpetrating genocide, environmental
harms, and violent acts on indigenous tribe), dismissed with prejudice, No. CIV.A.96-1474,
1998 WL 92246 (E.D. La. Mar. 3, 1998); John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880
(C.D. Cal. 1997) (alleging complicity between Unocal and the military government of
Burma in perpetrating torture, forced labor, and slavery); Alomang v. Freeport-
McMoRan, Inc., No. 96 CIV.A.96-2139, 1996 WL 601431 (E.D. La. Oct. 17, 1996) (alleg-
ing complicity between Freeport-McMoRan Corporation and the Indonesian Government
in perpetrating genocide, environmental harms, and violent acts on indigenous workers)
cert. denied No. 98-C-1352, 1998 WL 770744 (La. July 2, 1998); Alomang v. Freeport-
McMoRan, Inc., 718 So. 2d 971 (La. Ct. App. 1998), affd on reh'g, 1998 La. App. LEXIS
2119 (La. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 1998), cert. denied, No. 98-C-1352, 1998 La. LEXIS 2308 (La.
1999]
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that corporations either improve their international standards and prac-
tices or answer to American juries for their complicity with abusive re-
gimes, human rights advocates are suing MNCs for human rights viola-
tions perpetrated by their foreign government partners."
While these human rights plaintiffs allege various grounds for jurisdic-
tion and liability, the primary statutory authority for these suits is the an-
cient and once obscure Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA or the statute).22
The ATCA provides that "[tihe district courts shall have original juris-
diction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in viola-
tion of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States., 23 In addition
July 2, 1998) (same). Several press accounts also document the recent spate of corporate
ATCA litigation. See, e.g., Dominic Bencivenga, Human Rights Abuses: Suits Attempt to
Extend Liability to Corporations, N.Y.L.J., Sep. 4, 1997, at 5 (analyzing the Unocal case
and its implications for corporate governance); James Ledbetter, Think Globally, Sue Lo-
cally, VILLAGE VOICE, Nov. 26, 1996, at 18 (discussing renewed use of the ATCA to force
corporations to withdraw financial support from repressive foreign regimes); Tony
McAuley, Rights Group Prepares to Sue Chevron Over Nigeria Deaths (visited Oct. 12,
1998) <http://cnn.com/WORLD/africa/9810/1 2/B C-CHEVRON-NIGERIA.reut/index.
html> (reporting on planned suit against Chevron for complicity with Nigerian Govern-
ment in committing human rights violations).
21. See Stewart Yerton, World Will Watch Lawsuits' Outcome, NEW ORLEANS
TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 11, 1997, at F1, available in 1997 WL 4220456; supra note 20 (list-
ing corporate ATCA cases filed to date); discussion infra Parts II.B-E (analyzing claims
against Frerport-McMoRan, Unocal, Shell, and Chevron).
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994); see Joseph D. Pizzurro & Nancy E. Delaney, New Peril
for Companies Doing Business Overseas: Alien Tort Claims Act Interpreted Broadly,
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 24, 1997, at S5 (reviewing the emergence of modern ATCA litigation). For
a comprehensive review of virtually every aspect of human rights litigation under the
ATCA, to date, see generally, BETH STEPHENS & MICHAEL RATNER, INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS (1996). Courts have taken three ap-
proaches to ATCA suits: 1) permitting suits for a few heinous acts that violate interna-
tional law, 2) granting an implicit right to sue and applying federal common law, and 3)
interpreting it as a forum shifting statute for transitory torts and applying the forum state's
choice of law rules which should ultimately apply the law of the situs. See id. at 120; see
also Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2366-
69 (1991) (describing major cases brought under the ATCA).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1350. The ATCA has no explicit legislative history. See William R.
Casto, The Federal Courts' Protective Jurisdiction Over Torts Committed in Violation of
the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 495 (1986) ("There is no significant mention of
[the ATCA] in either the records of the congressional debates or the correspondence of
the senators who drafted the legislation."). Congress provided originally that the district
courts "shall also have cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, or the
circuit courts, as the case may be, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in viola-
tion of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §
9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77. Subsequent technical changes to the statutory language to reflect the
management of exclusive federal jurisdiction have not changed the substantive meaning of
the ATCA. See Casto, supra, at 468 n.4 (1986). This Comment does not discuss the role
of treaties in establishing ATCA subject matter jurisdiction. For a discussion of what con-
stitutes a tort "in violation of a treaty of the United States" see STEPHENS & RATNER,
supra note 22, at 58-61.
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to damages, at least one plaintiff has asserted ATCA jurisdiction in
search of injunctive relief to prevent corporate defendants from con-
tinuing with foreign development projects.24 One plaintiff's attorney
summarized this strategy by saying, "'[i]f sheer morality doesn't do it,
maybe hitting the pocketbook of companies will make a difference."' 2s
Only one ATCA suit against a private corporate defendant, however,
has survived even a motion for summary judgment." This dearth of sus-
24. See Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 883 (seeking damages, injunctive, and declaratory re-
lief that would prevent corporate defendant from continuing with the development of
natural gas pipeline project).
25. Bencivenga, supra note 20, at 5 (quoting Jennifer Green, an attorney with the
Center for Constitutional Rights in New York). But see STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note
22, at 216-24 (discussing the difficulties encountered, to date, in enforcing ATCA judg-
ments). Stephens and Ratner note that, with the exception of a "paltry $400," "the multi-
million dollar judgments in prior ATCA cases have gone uncollected." Id. at 218. Those
judgments, however, were against private individual defendants with minimal assets in the
United States. See id. Corporate defendants with assets in the United States may not be
quite as judgment proof.
26. See Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 897-98 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (denying in part corporate
defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a
claim). Courts have dismissed many corporate ATCA claims for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. See Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L., 730 F.2d 1103 (7th Cir. 1984);
Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978); IIT v. Vencap, Ltd.,
519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975); Abiodun v. Martin Oil Serv., Inc., 475 F.2d 142 (7th Cir.
1973); Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 97 Civ. 2858, 1998 WL 293990 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 1998);
Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La. 1997) (dismissing also for
failure to state a claim), dismissed with prejudice, No. CIV.A.96-1474, 1998 WL 92246
(E.D. La. Mar. 3, 1998); Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y.
1991); De Wit v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, N.V., 570 F. Supp. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); B.T.
Shanker Hedge v. British Airways, No. 82-C-1410, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16469 (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 27, 1982); Trans-Continental Inv. Corp., S.A. v. Bank of the Commonwealth, 500 F.
Supp. 565 (C.D. Cal. 1980); Alomang v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., No. 96-9962 (Civ. Dist.
for the Parish of Orleans Div. H-12 1997) (dismissing also for exception to venue), affd on
reh'g, 718 So. 2d 971 (La. Ct. App. 1998), cert. denied, No. 98-C-1352, 1998 La. LEXIS
2308 (La. July 2, 1998). Second Circuit courts have dismissed several corporate ATCA
cases on forum non conveniens grounds. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96
Civ. 8386, slip op. at 1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 25, 1998); Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., No. 93 Civ.
7527, 1994 WL 142006 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1994) (dismissing also for failure to join the Ec-
uadorian government and a state entity as indispensable parties), vacated, Jota v. Texaco,
Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that the district court erred in dismissing the case
without requiring the corporate defendant to accept jurisdiction in Ecuador). Finally,
courts have dismissed several corporate ATCA cases on other procedural grounds. See
Carmichael v. United Techs. Corp., 835 F.2d 109 (5th Cir. 1988) (dismissing ATCA claim
for lack of personal jurisdiction and insufficient evidence); National Coalition Gov't of the
Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (dismissing claims
against Unocal by the Burmese Government in exile for lack of standing, while permitting
the Federation of Trade Unions of Burma to amend its complaint against the corpora-
tion); Alomang v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., No. CIV.A.96-2139, 1996 WL 601431 (E.D.
La. Oct. 17, 1996) (remanding to state court a class action suit similar to Beanal v.
Freeport-McMoRan); Canadian Overseas Ores Ltd. v. Compania de Acero Del Pacifico
1999]
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tainable cases against private defendants flows from a combination of
vague statutory language and judicial interpretations imposing a state ac-
tion requirement for most claims." Ultimately, this conflict over the
meaning and application of the statute weakens the effectiveness of
ATCA litigation in two ways. First, the statute fails to define actionable
claims with sufficient precision to serve as the basis for a well-pleaded
complaint or provide meaningful guidance for lawful transnational cor-
porate conduct.8 Second, courts apply inconsistent judicial interpreta-
tions of American constitutional standards to determine whether U.S.-
based MNCs are liable for the actions of foreign sovereigns affecting
• 29
their own nationals. Thus, because our domestic law does not incorpo-
rate specific "alien torts" or regulate the relationship between U.S.-based
corporations and their foreign host-governments, MNCs can evade li-
ability for their role in overseas human rights violations. °
This Comment discusses the ATCA liability of MNCs for human rights
violations by their foreign government partners and argues that Congress
should enact legislation to clarify the evolving standard of conduct cur-
rently incorporated into the statute. Part I of this Comment examines
the legal and historical underpinnings of modern ATCA jurisprudence.
In Part II, this Comment analyzes the weaknesses of the ATCA's juris-
prudential framework as applied to private corporate defendants in hu-
S.A., 528 F. Supp. 1337 (S.D.N:Y. 1982) (dismissing business related ATCA claim on
grounds of foreign sovereign immunity).
27. See discussion infra Parts II.B.2, II.C.2, and II.D.
28. See generally discussion infra Parts II and III (describing the inconsistent judicial
approach to liability for corporate conduct related to human rights abuses overseas).
29. Courts apply "color of law" jurisprudence derived from a domestic civil rights
statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994), to test for state action in ATCA claims. See, e.g., Kadic v.
Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 1995); Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 890; Freeport-McMoRan,
969 F. Supp. at 375-76. The cases deciding whether private action may be fairly ascribed
to the state "have not been a model of consistency." Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger
Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 378 (1995) (quoting Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S.
614, 632 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)). Application of § 1983 in corporate ATCA liti-
gation has been similarly inconsistent. Compare Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 890-91 (finding
state action in the absence of any allegations that the corporate defendant actually com-
mitted human rights abuses), with Freeport-McMoRan, 969 F. Supp. at 374-80 (finding no
state action although the corporate defendant allegedly committed human rights abuses
and a "close" business relationship existed between the corporation and the foreign host-
government). See also infra notes 154-68 and accompanying text (discussing the applica-
tion of § 1983 to ATCA litigation); infra notes 220-40 and accompanying text (analyzing
the application of § 1983 tests in Freeport-McMoRan); infra Part II.D (criticizing results
flowing from the inconsistent application of § 1983 "color of law" jurisprudence in corpo-
rate ATCA cases).
30. See, e.g., Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., No. CIV.A.96-1474, 1998 WL 92246
(E.D. La. Mar. 3, 1998) (dismissing with prejudice plaintiff's third amended complaint for
failure to state a claim).
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man rights cases arising from business practices in non-Western cultural
settings. Part II argues also that inconsistent judicial interpretation of
the statute and its attendant "universal norms" undermines the effec-
tiveness of the ATCA in both guiding global corporate conduct and pro-
viding a remedy for victims of human rights abuses. Part III of this
Comment proposes that judge-made federal common law be augmented
by amending the ATCA to incorporate specific claims into U.S. domestic
law, rather than basing jurisdiction solely on the narrow and subjective
legal fiction of universal norms. Finally, this Comment concludes that
whether or not developing nations agree, the United States must recog-
nize that corporate involvement in human rights abuses "apart from be-
ing morally repugnant ... is simply not necessary for the successful con-
duct of business here or overseas.,
31
I. THE ONCE AND FUTURE ATCA: INCORPORATING INTERNATIONAL
OBLIGATIONS INTO DOMESTIC LAW
It is unclear what Congress intended the ATCA to accomplish.32 Plain-
tiffs and human rights advocates view the ATCA as incorporating within
it an ever-expanding range of potential claims.33 Corporate defendants
argue, however, that Congress did not intend for the statute to reach
claims based on violations of international law arising out of a business
relationship between a foreign host-government and a private corporate
34defendant. Accordingly, commentators view the ATCA either as a
limited part of an anachronistic scheme to regulate the interaction of
domestic law and foreign relations, or as an ever-expanding means of ad-
vancing the cause of international human rights. ATCA claims, thus,
confront federal district courts with the task of imbuing a single archaic
31. S. REP. No. 95-114, at 4 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4101 (inter-
nal quotations omitted). Treasury Secretary Blumenthal made this statement while testi-
fying about the criminalization of foreign corporate bribery and, consequently, the need
for the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977. See id.
32. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork,
J., concurring) ("Historical research has not as yet disclosed what section 1350 was in-
tended to accomplish."); Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act
of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 461, 463 (1989) (providing an excellent
overview and comparative analysis of various historical perspectives on the ATCA).
33. See STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 22, at 53-54.
34. See, e.g., Freeport-McMoRan, 969 F. Supp. at 366-67; Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 890.
35. Compare Joseph Modeste Sweeney, A Tort Only in Violation of the Law of Na-
tions, 18 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 445, 446-47 (1995) (asserting that Congress
intended the ATCA to provide jurisdiction only over prize cases), with Burley, supra note
32, at 493 (positing an open-ended approach to meeting the nation's expanding interna-
tional obligations, both legal and moral).
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and indeterminate statutory sentence with sufficient meaning to be rele-
vant in the context of modern transnational human rights litigation.36
A. More Symbol than Substance: The Evolution of the Law of Nations in
the Context of the Alien Tort Claims Act
Scholars disagree over the Framers' comprehension of the scope of the
law of nations and "their general attitude toward compliance with the
obligations it imposed."37 One of the most conservative interpretations38
limits alien tort actions to three principle offenses recognized as violating
the law of nations in 1789: 1) violation of safe-conducts, 2) infringement
39of the rights of ambassadors, and 3) piracy. In contrast, a more expan-
sive view of the ATCA posits an open-ended statute reflecting the Fram-
ers' desire to balance national self-interest with their understanding of
the nation's evolving moral and legal duties as a member of the interna-
tional community.
40
1. "[N]o one seems to know [from] whence it came. ,4'
Although Congress originally adopted the ATCA as a provision of the
36. Cf. Casto, supra note 23, at 486, 495. While characterizing the statutory language
as "cryptic" and observing the dearth of legislative history, Professor Casto found "signifi-
cant clues" to the ATCA's purpose in the legislative history of the Judiciary Act of 1789.
See id. Scholars debate, however, the interpretation of those "clues." See infra notes 37-
49 and accompanying text (discussing conflicting historical interpretations of the ATCA's
origin).
37. Burley, supra note 32, at 463.
38. See generally Sweeney, supra note 35 (arguing that the ATCA applies only to
prize cases). Joseph Sweeney offers perhaps the most conservative interpretation of the
ATCA, and his narrow reading of the statute would render it superfluous in modern hu-
man rights litigation. Sweeney contends that at the time Oliver Ellsworth, a colonial Con-
necticut lawyer, drafted the ATCA, the statutory language "tort only" "could mean noth-
ing but the wrongs committed by American captors in violation of the law of prize." Id. at
476. For a critique of Sweeney's view of the ATCA see, William S. Dodge, The Historical
Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the "Originalists", 19 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 221, 223-24 (1996).
39. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork,
J., concurring) (quoting Blackstone, "a writer certainly familiar to colonial lawyers" in
1789 when Congress enacted the statute).
40. See Burley, supra note 32, at 482-84. Professor Burley notes, however, that, even
at the beginning of the Republic, Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson disagreed
over the precise substance of the nation's moral and legal duties, particularly the distinc-
tion between the duties of individuals and the obligations of states. See id. at 484-85.
41. liT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (referring to the uncertain
legislative genesis of the ATCA).
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First Judiciary Act of 1789, existing legislative and historical sources tell
42
us little about its purpose. Several competing theories identify the
ATCA as part of an overall scheme to protect national security and pro-
vide federal oversight in cases involving the denial of justice to aliens
mistreated by U.S. citizens.4' Each of these approaches identifying the
genesis of the ATCA highlights the role of the statute in guaranteeing
federal, rather than state, control over matters involving foreign relations
and international law."
One theory underscores a series of international scandals arising out of
torts committed in the United States against foreign diplomats, as the
impetus for the ATCA.45 The absence of federal jurisdiction over these
tort claims asserted by foreign diplomats constrained litigation to state
courts, thereby dangerously circumscribing the Federal Government's
ability to intervene in matters that affected potentially both foreign rela-
42. See, Burley, supra note 32, at 463 (opining that "definitive proof of the intended
purpose and scope of the [ATCA] is impossible"). But see Kenneth C. Randall, Federal
Jurisdiction Over International Law Claims: Inquiries Into the Alien Tort Statute, 18
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 72 (1985) (concluding that the ATCA's origin and intent are
not obscure, but flow from the drafters' concern regarding federal oversight of foreign re-
lations).
43. Compare Casto, supra note 23, at 488-96 (theorizing that Congress originally in-
tended the ATCA to provide for the protection and security of foreign diplomats), and
Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 814-15 (Bork, J., concurring) (asserting that congressional intent to
enact the ATCA for the protection of ambassadors is "plausible historically"), with An-
thony D'Amato, The Alien Tort Statute and the Founding of the Constitution, 82 AM. J.
INT'L L. 62, 64 (1988) (arguing that Congress enacted the ATCA because mistreatment of
any alien, not merely diplomats, could lead to war), and Randall, supra note 42, at 20-21
(asserting that Congress enacted the ATCA in response to concerns that denial of justice
to aliens might offend foreign nations and give rise to war). But cf. Burley, supra note 32,
at 475 (contending that the ATCA reflects congressional recognition of the nation's
broader obligation to promote and enforce international law that directly regulates indi-
vidual conduct).
44. Cf. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1540 n.6 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (recog-
nizing that Congress apparently intended the ATCA to facilitate federal oversight of mat-
ters related to international law).
45. See Casto, supra note 23, at 491-93. While Professor Casto opines "that section
1350 should be construed as liberally as possible," he contends that attacks on French
Consul General Marbois in Philadelphia in 1784, and on a member of the household of
Dutch Ambassador Van Berckel motivated Congress to enact the ATCA. See id. at 472,
491-96. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court eventually convicted Marbois's attacker (who
was also French) of a crime in violation of the law of nations, which it held to be incorpo-
rated into state law. See Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (Dall.) 111, 115 (1784).
The delay in justice, however, created an international uproar centered on the ambassa-
dor's inability to obtain redress in America's federal courts. See Casto, supra note 23, at
492-99. Professor Casto argues, however, that Congress created the ATCA as "an open-
ended statute" modeled on transgression against diplomats, yet broad enough to be re-
sponsive to "all foreseeable and unforeseeable violations by individuals of the law of na-
tions." Id. at 500.
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tions and national security.6 Recognizing that the international commu-
nity would hold the national, not state, government accountable for the
conduct of American citizens, the Framers created the ATCA to transfer
jurisdiction over alien torts to federal courts.47
A broader view, however, suggests that the Framers' apprehension
about the denial of justice extended beyond ambassadors and diplomats,
to the plight of any alien mistreated by U.S. citizens at home or abroad.48
This assessment views the ATCA as "a direct response to what the
Founders understood to be the nation's duty to propagate and enforce
those international law rules that directly regulated individual conduct.
49
2. "We confront at every turn broad and novel questions about the
definition and application of the 'law of nations. "5
The precise scope of what torts the Framers intended to fall within the
reach of the statute remains unclear." In 1781, foreshadowing and per-
haps explaining the ATCA, the Continental Congress passed an expan-
sive resolution urging the states to provide remedies for several specific
offenses against the law of nations.52 In addition to the "most obvious"
offenses concerning safe conducts, diplomatic protection, and treaty vio-
46. See D'Amato, supra note 43, at 64-65. In eighteenth century political culture,
European powers considered mistreatment of individual citizens abroad sufficient excuse
to engage in armed conflict. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 404 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Buccaneer Books 1992). Hamilton wrote: "As the denial or perversion of justice by the
sentences of the courts ... is with reason classed among the just causes of war, it will fol-
low that the federal judiciary ought to have cognizance of all causes in which the citizens
of other countries are concerned." Id.
47. See Casto, supra note 23, at 488-98.
48. See Burley, supra note 32, at 475; D'Amato, supra note 43, at 64-65. Professor
Burley also suggests that the drafters could have envisioned ATCA suits between aliens
for torts committed on U.S. soil or on the high seas. See Burley, supra note 32, at 488. It
seems unlikely, however, that the Framers' expected the ATCA to be invoked by an alien
in a suit against his own government for a tort committed within that government's own
jurisdiction. See id.
49. Burley, supra note 32, at 475.
50. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards,
J., concurring).
51. Compare id. at 775, 789 (Edwards, J., concurring) (asserting that the ATCA
grants jurisdiction over a "minute" number of cases, but is not limited to Blackstone's
enumerated offenses), with id. at 813-16 (Bork, J., concurring) (arguing that ATCA juris-
diction is restricted to the principal offenses against the law of nations at the time Con-
gress enacted the statute), and id. at 823, 827 (Robb, S.C.J., concurring) (declining to reach
the issue of actionable alien torts because of the political question doctrine, and observing
that judicial reliance on commentators to define what acts have evolved into violations of
the law of nations will yield nothing more authoritative than a battle of experts).
52. See 21 J. CONTINENTAL CONG. 1136-37 (1781), quoted in Burley, supra note 32,
at 476.
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lations, the Congress further encouraged the states to allow suits for ad-
ditional "offen[s]es... not contained in the foregoing enumeration.""
Congress's open-ended approach to alien tort actions in 1781 permit-
ted incorporation of international obligations into municipal law. 4 Con-
sequently, direct enforcement of these norms by private individuals be-
came feasible through the nation's internal domestic law.5  This
approach is consistent with the jurisdictional grant later conferred by the
ATCA, which ensured the availability of a forum for alien tort actions
while leaving it to the courts to elaborate the law.56 Indeed, the courts
quickly declared that the law of nations, whatever it was or might be-
come, was securely ensconced in federal common law.57
a. Finding the Law of Nations: Early Cases
While the U.S. Supreme Court proclaimed the law of nations as "the
universal law of society,"5 8 an explicit definition of the law of nations re-
mained elusive. 9 In 1820, Justice Story, writing for the Court in United
53. Id. Blackstone, likewise, exhorted all governments to communicate relevant in-
ternational standards to their citizens by incorporating offenses against the law of nations
into their respective municipal laws. See Burley, supra note 32, at 475-76 (quoting W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 881 (G. Chase 4th ed.
1923)).
54. See Burley, supra note 32, at 476-77 (arguing that the 1781 resolution was "expan-
sive" and designed to permit domestic enforcement of the evolving tenets of international
law).
55. Cf. GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 11 (Hurst Hannum
ed., 2d ed. 1992) [hereinafter GUIDE] (discussing the means of incorporating international
obligations into domestic law).
56. See Burley, supra note 32, at 476-77.
57. See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("International law is
part of our law."); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 161 (1820) ("[T]he law
of nations ... is part of the common law .. "); The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423
(1815) (asserting that the law of nations "is a part of the law of the land"); Talbot v. Jan-
son, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 161 (1795) (holding that the law of nations is a part federal com-
mon law). Indeed, American courts integrated the law of nations into domestic law before
the Congress ratified the Constitution. See Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 DalI.)
111, 114 (1784) (asserting that the law of nations was part of Pennsylvania state law).
British law also adopts the law of nations as the law of the land. See JANIS, supra note 11,
at 99 (quoting Blackstone). But see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary
International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110
HARV. L. REV. 815, 819-21 (1997) (arguing that customary international law is not a
source of federal law because neither Congress, nor the President, have ever authorized its
incorporation into domestic law).
58. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 159.
59. See, e.g., id. at 157 (noting one nineteenth century attorney's argument: "To refer
to the law of nations for a definition of the crime, is not a definition; [sic] for the very thing
to be ascertained by the definition, is the law of nations on the subject.").
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States v. Smith,6° observed that there existed no complete or accurate
61public code defining the law of nations. Instead, the Court "found" the
law of nations by consulting scholarly writings, state practice, and rele-
vant judicial decisions.62 Justice Livingston, dissenting in Smith, argued,
however, that Congress had a duty to incorporate definitions of interna-
tional law into the nation's statutory law. 6' He rejected any analysis re-
quiring American citizens to refer to unfamiliar foreign laws to ascertain
rules of conduct"'
65While riding circuit one year later, Justice Story relied on natural law
traditions and emerging state practice in the piracy case United States v.
66La Jeune Eugenie, to condemn slave trading as a violation of "universal
law., 67 After surveying the moral proscription against slavery, referring
to contemporary European conferences promoting abolition, and distin-
guishing one contrary British judicial opinion, Justice Story concluded
60. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820).
61. See id. at 159.
62. See id. at 160-61.
63. See id. at 182 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
64. See id. at 181-82 (Livingston, J., dissenting). Implicit in Justice Livingston's dis-
sent is the seed of the political question doctrine. See id. at 178-81 (asserting that the leg-
islature must define violations of the law of nations). Chief Justice Fuller's dissent in The
Paquete Habana further developed concerns underlying the political question doctrine.
See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 715-20 (1900) (Fuller, C.J., dissenting). Quoting
Chief Justice Marshall, Chief Justice Fuller opined that the courts should resolve questions
of law, not issues of foreign policy. See id. at 715-16. Chief Justice Fuller observed further
that contrary expert opinions could be found on international law issues and thus "[i]t is
needless to review the speculations and repetitions of the writers on international law...
[because] [t]heir lucubrations may be persuasive, but are not authoritative." Id. at 720; see
also infra notes 83-84 and accompanying text (discussing the political question doctrine).
The modern political question doctrine is a constitutional rejection of judicial competence
to make decisions in the area of international relations. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
217 (1962). For judicial discussions of the political question doctrine in the context of
ATCA cases, see Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207 (S.D. Fla. 1993) in which the court denied
a motion to dismiss based on a political question, and Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,
726 F.2d 774, 823-27 (1984) (Robb, S.J., concurring) in which Senior Judge Robb argued
for dismissal of an ATCA claim on the basis of the political question doctrine. See gener-
ally STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 22, at 141-45 (discussing the chances of a political
question argument prevailing in an ATCA suit).
65. Cf. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 142-43 (2d ed.
1985). The Judiciary Act of 1789 created three judicial circuits, each composed of two Su-
preme Court justices and a district judge. See id. at 142. The Supreme Court justices trav-
eled to their circuits several times a year to try cases arising out of diversity jurisdiction
and hear a limited number of appeals. See id. at 143.
66. 26 F. Cas. 832 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551).
67. See id. at 851. Justice Story opined that the law of nations could be "deduced...
from the general principles of right and justice," customary state practice, and conven-
tional laws regulating international affairs. Id. at 846.
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that recent state practices and customs recognized slave trading as an of-
fense against the law of nations.8
Three years later in The Antelope,69 however, Chief Justice Marshall
conducted his own survey of state practices and, contrary to Justice
Story's opinion in Smith, found that many nations, including the United
States and Africa, continued to permit slavery.0 While acknowledging
the natural law proscription against the practice, two recent centuries of
African, American, and European participation in slave trading con-
vinced Marshall that proclaiming a universal consensus against slavery
was premature.' Although Congress had recently enacted several stat-
utes defining slave trading as piracy, Marshall held that the law of the
United States did not transform slave trading into a violation of the law
of nations. 3 In Marshall's view, no nation could prescribe a rule for oth-
ers or make a law of nations. 4 Consequently, because the prohibition
against slave trading lacked the universal assent necessary to find a viola-
tion of the law of nations, the practice remained lawful to governments
who had not forbidden it.
75
b. Ancient Usage and Ripening Rules: The Paquete Habana 6
As a practical matter, the argument between Marshall and Story over
whether slave trading violated the law of nations turned on the issue of
ripening.7 The Court did not clearly enunciate that concept, however,
68. See id. at 845-51. Justice Story wrote that "[i]t does not follow... that because a
principle cannot be found settled by the consent or practice of nations at one time, it is to
be concluded, that at no subsequent period the principle can be considered as incorpo-
rated into the public code of nations." Id. at 846.
69. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825).
70. See id. at 122-23.
71. See id.
72. See id. at 71-72.
73. See id. at 122-23.
74. See id.
75. See id. Chief Justice Marshall held that "the perfect equality of nations" pre-
vented one nation from prescribing a rule for others. Id. at 122. This opinion is also re-
flected in modern judgments by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). See North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 4 (Feb. 20). The ICJ
has held that the relevant "[sItate practice.., should [be] both extensive and virtually uni-
form in the sense of the provision invoked." Id. at 43.
76. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
77. Compare The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 121-22 (finding, implicitly, that
slave trading had not ripened into a violation of universal law because, despite its moral
repugnance, some nations still engaged in slavery and slave trading), with La Jeune
Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 846-47, 851 (C.C.D. Mass. 1821) (finding, implicitly, that the
moral proscription against slave trading had ripened sufficiently so that is was prohibited
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until the beginning of the twentieth century." In The Paquete Habana,
the Court thoroughly documented customary international practices that
related to exempting coastal fishing vessels from capture as prizes of war
to establish "an ancient usage ... gradually ripening into a rule of inter-
national law."79 Engaging in a simple, but exhaustive, balancing test, the
Court observed that, while countries of the world accepted the capture of
fishing vessels as prizes of war occasionally in the past, they rejected the
practice far more often and recently.80 Thus, the Court held that the pro-
scription against seizing fishing vessels had ripened into an accepted rule
of international law "by the general assent of civilized nations.' Hence,
ripening seemed to imply uniformity and consistency of international
state practice, but not the unanimity Justice Marshall demanded in The
Antelope."
Chief Justice Fuller, dissenting in The Paquete Habana, argued that de-
termining customary international practice was more of a political policy
judgment than question of law. 3 He reasoned, therefore, that the inquiry
of what practices had sufficiently ripened was better suited for the legis-
lature, which can adjust the law at will, than the judiciary, which can only
interpret the law as it is written."4
B. The Tortuous Trail to Tortious Conduct: Finding a Tort in Violation
of the Law of Nations at the End of the Twentieth-Century
Consistent with The Paquete Habana, Congress interpreted the ATCA
in 1992 as permitting suits based on either existing norms or those that
may eventually ripen into rules of customary international law.85 Unfor-
by universal law because many nations acknowledged the inhumanity of the conduct and
were committed to promoting abolition).
78. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 686 (1900) (articulating the ripening stan-
dard).
79. Id. at 686.
80. See id. at 686-711. The Court reviewed state practices from 1403 through 1894.
See id.
81. Id. at 694, 700. "[Wjhere there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legis-
lative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized na-
tions." Id. at 700. Thus, statutes enacted under domestic law "preempt existing principles
of customary international law." Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan,
859 F.2d 929, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
82. See JANIS, supra note 11, at 45-46.
83. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 715-16 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
84. See id. at 716. But see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (holding that not
"every case or controversy which touches foreign relations [is] beyond judicial cogni-
zance").
85. See H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 4 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84 (House
Report on the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991).
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tunately, the paucity of cases brought under the statute in its first 191
years? does little to clarify what international torts have ripened suffi-
ciently to warrant incorporation into the ATCA's ever-evolving defini-
tion of the law of nations.87 ATCA claims, therefore, generate significant
time-consuming disputes at the jurisdictional threshold because the statu-
tory phrase "tort ... in violation of the law of nations" has no clearly ac-
cepted meaning in modern law.Y Consequently, each court confronting
an ATCA claim must "engage[] in a more searching preliminary review
of the merits than is required" for other jurisdictional formulations."
Courts and commentators continue to debate whether the judicial proc-
ess involved in ascertaining the law of nations is more art than science.90
1. Commanding the "General Assent of Civilized Nations": Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala9'
Modern courts have supplemented The Paquete Habana's enduring
and oft-cited approach with a contemporary framework for determining
when customary state practice has sufficiently ripened to become inter-
national law.92 In 1980, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals articulated
86. See Randall, supra note 42, at 4-5 n.15 (comprising the most comprehensive pub-
lished research to date on ATCA cases). Professor Randall reported that plaintiffs as-
serted ATCA jurisdiction in only 21 cases before the seminal Filartiga decision in 1980.
See id. Before Filartiga, courts sustained ATCA jurisdiction only twice in 191 years. See
Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 864-65 (D. Md. 1961) (finding, in a child custody case, that
falsifying a minor child's passport and wrongfully transporting the child from country to
country violated the law of nations); Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.C.D.S.C. 1795)
(No. 1,607) (sustaining jurisdiction in maritime war prize case); see also Randall, supra
note 42, at 5. Several attorney's general also discussed the ATCA. See, e.g., 26 Op. Att'y
Gen. 250 (1907) (opining that the ATCA provided Mexican citizens with a forum and
right of action in the United States based on a claim that an American company wrong-
fully changed the boundary line between the two countries by diverting the waters of the
Rio Grande); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57 (1795) (opining that the ATCA provides jurisdiction for
tortious acts committed on the high seas).
87. See STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 22, at 49-50 (discussing the courts' struggle
to identify torts cognizable under the ATCA).
88. See id. at 50.
89. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980). The Filartiga court
compared the complexities involved in ascertaining whether a plaintiff has properly as-
serted a violation of the law of nations under the ATCA with the broader and less com-
plex "arising under" formulation attending federal question jurisdiction. See id. at 887-88.
The Filartiga court observed also that "[tJhe paucity of suits successfully maintained under
[the ATCA] is readily attributable to the statute's requirement of alleging a 'violation of
the law of nations' at the jurisdictional threshold." Id. at 887 (emphasis omitted).
90. See JANIS, supra note 11, at 44-54 (surveying judicial approaches in determining
the content of customary international law).
91. 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980).
92. See, e.g., id.; Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1540 (N.D. Cal. 1987). For
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a modern test for ATCA jurisdiction in the landmark human rights case
of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.93 In Filartiga, an expatriate Paraguayan family
asserted ATCA jurisdiction to sue a former Paraguayan official for
wrongfully kidnapping and torturing their son.94 The federal district
court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the case for lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction, finding that the law of nations did not "govern[]
a state's treatment of its own citizens."9'
The Second Circuit reversed, however, observing that in the modern
world, a nation's treatment of its own citizens is a matter of international
•96
interest. Following the analytical framework set forth in Smith and The
Paquete Habana, the court scrutinized numerous sources before con-
cluding that, regardless of the nationalities of the parties, deliberate
state-sponsored torture had ripened into a violation of international
law.97 The court noted, however, that not every wrong, even if prohibited
by most of the countries of the world, violates the law of nations.98
The Filartiga court adopted The Paquete Habana's conception of an
evolving law of nations and its attendant ripening requirement. 99 Ac-
cordingly, the court chose to interpret international law not as it existed
when Congress enacted the statute, but as it has evolved and prevailed
among modern nations.)° The Filartiga court provided three general
an analysis of the process used by the Forti court in concluding that certain torts were vio-
lations of the law of nations (prolonged arbitrary detention, summary execution, and
causing disappearance) while others were not (cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment),
see generally, Christopher M. Leh, Comment, Remedying Foreign Repression Through
U.S. Courts: Forti v. Suarez-Mason and the Recognition of Torture, Summary Execution,
Prolonged Arbitrary Detention and Causing Disappearance as Cognizable Claims Under
the Alien Tort Claims Act, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 405 (1988).
93. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). For an excellent analysis of Filartiga and its impact
on ATCA litigation, see generally Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Juris-
diction Over International Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filartiga
v. Pena-Irala, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 53 (1981).
94. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878.
95. Id. at 880. The district court acknowledged "that official torture violat[ed] an
emerging norm of customary international law," but interpreted previous Second Circuit
cases as preventing jurisdiction. Id.
96. See id. at 878, 881. The court based its ruling, in part, on provisions of the United
Nations Charter, which is a treaty of the United States. See id. at 881 (citing 59 Stat. 1033
(1945)).
97. See id. at 880-85.
98. See id. at 888. The court cited an earlier Second Circuit opinion noting that even
if every nation incorporated into its municipal law the Eighth Commandment's prohibi-
tion against stealing, theft would not be a violation of the law of nations unless many na-
tions recognized it as such by entering into international accords prohibiting such conduct.
See id. (quoting liT v. Vencap, 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975)).
99. See id. at 881.
100. See id. (citing Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 198 (1796)) ("distinguishing be-
[Vol. 48:881
Profits and Principles
guidelines for determining whether a customary wrong has ripened into a
violation of modern international law within the meaning of the
ATCA.'0 ' First, the wrong must be a violation that "command[s] the
'general assent of civilized nations."" 2 Second, the prohibition against
the wrong must be "clear and unambiguous."' 0'3 Finally, the nations of
the world must demonstrate expressly by international accords "that the
wrong is of mutual, and not merely several, concern.""" The court, there-
fore, cited numerous international treaties and accords as the basis for its
determination that the modem usage and practice of civilized nations
clearly and unambiguously renounced state-sponsored torture. Ac-
cordingly, the Filartiga court held that torture was a violation of the law
of nations for which the ATCA provided federal jurisdiction. 6
tween 'ancient' and 'modern' law of nations").
101. See id. at 881, 884, 888.
102. Id. at 881 (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 694 (1900)).
103. Id. at 884.
104. Id. at 888.
105. See id. at 883-84.
106. See id. at 880, 887. After Filartiga, a variety of alien plaintiffs relied on the ATCA
to sue current and former public officials of their own governments. See, e.g., Abebe-Jira
v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 846-48 (11th Cir. 1996) (affirming a damages judgment under
ATCA against a former Ethiopian official for torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding alleged war crimes,
genocide, and other atrocities committed by Bosnian Serb leader cognizable under
ATCA), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2524 (1996); In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human
Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467, 1472-76 (9th Cir. 1994) (permitting class action claims un-
der ATCA for torture, disappearance, and summary execution by the Marcos regime in
the Philippines); National Coalition Gov't of the Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176
F.R.D. 329, 349 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (finding a claim brought by Burmese citizens against
Burma's military junta actionable); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. 1078, 1092-
94 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (finding Bolivian citizen's conspiracy with Bolivian authorities to arbi-
trarily detain a Kodak employee actionable under the ATCA); John Doe I v. Unocal
Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 888, 892, 896, 898 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (finding a claim brought by
Burmese citizens against U.S.-based MNC actionable, but dismissing claims against Bur-
mese government entities on the basis of foreign sovereign immunity); Cabiri v. Assasie-
Gyimah, 921 F. Supp. 1189, 1196-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (permitting claims brought by former
Ghanaian trade counselor against Ghanaian National Security Officer alleging torture);
Mushikiwabo v. Barayagwiza, No. 94-CIV-3627, 1996 WL 164496, at *2-*3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
9, 1996) (awarding damages under the ATCA against a Rwandan official for acts of geno-
cide); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 169, 189, 202 (D. Mass. 1995) (awarding de-
fault judgments for compensatory and punitive damages to plaintiffs who brought suit
against the Guatemalan Minister of Defense for human rights abuses perpetrated by
armed forces); Paul v. Avril, 901 F. Supp. 330, 335-36 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (awarding damages
against a former Haitian military official for human rights abuses); Lafontant v. Aristide,
844 F. Supp. 128,139-40 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (dismissing ATCA claims against Haitian leader
because of head-of-state immunity); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1540-44
(N.D. Cal. 1987) (Forti 1) (alleging that former Argentine general perpetrated acts of
prolonged arbitrary detention, torture, summary execution, and disappearance on Argen-
tine citizen), on reconsideration, 694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (Forti II).
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2. Universal, Definable, and Obligatory Norms
In the wake of Filartiga, Jeffrey Blum and Ralph Steinhardt suggested
four criteria to determine which torts are cognizable under the ATCA.
0 7
Under this formulation, torts in violation of the law of nations must be 1)
definable, 2) universal, and 3) obligatory norms that are 4) the object of
concerted international attention. 8 The first three criteria entered
ATCA jurisprudence in Judge Edwards's concurrence in Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republicj 9 a complex case brought by survivors of victims
murdered in a Palestine Liberation Organization attack on a civilian bus
in Israel. '" 0
In Tel-Oren, Judge Edwards observed that commentators had begun to
define the ATCA's scope by identifying "a handful of heinous actions"
that violated definable, universal and obligatory norms.1 He noted,
however, several flaws in this formulation, particularly the overwhelming
research involved when district courts undertake the burden of distilling
concrete principles of liability from a nebulous entity like the law of na-
tions."' Despite the weaknesses noted by Judge Edwards, international
law scholars have adopted this formulation,"3 and it emerged as the judi-
cial standard at the jurisdictional threshold in many subsequent ATCA
114
cases.
107. See Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 93, at 87-90.
108. See id.
109. 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (citing Blum &
Steinhardt, supra note 93, at 87-90).
110. See id. at 776 (Edwards, J., concurring). The three-judge panel, which dismissed
Tel-Oren for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, however, did not agree on the interpreta-
tion of the ATCA's statutory language. See id. at 775. Judge Edwards endorsed the Filar-
tiga approach but did not believe that international law imposed liability on a non-state
actor like the Palestine Liberation Organization. See id. at 776 (Edwards, J., concurring).
Judge Bork rejected the Filartiga court's reading of the statute as contrary to the role of
the courts under separation of powers principles. See id. at 799 (Bork, J., concurring).
Senior Circuit Judge Robb affirmed the dismissal on the grounds that the case raised a
non-justiciable political question. See id. at 823 (Robb, J., concurring).
11. Id. at 781 (Edwards, J., concurring).
112. See id. at 781-82 (Edwards, J., concurring). Judge Edwards discussed an alterna-
tive approach of using municipal law as the standard of liability, but he noted problems
involving the degree of nexus required between domestic and international torts. See id.
at 787-88.
113. See STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 22, at 322 (Affidavit of International Law
Scholars in Ortiz v. Gramajo).
114. See, e.g., Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1542-43 (N.D. Cal. 1987)
(Forti I) ("Before this Court may adjudicate a tort claim under § 1350, it must be satisfied
that the legal standard it is to apply is one with universal acceptance and definition; on no
other basis may the Court exercise jurisdiction over a claimed violation of the law of na-
tions."); see also cases cited supra note 106 (listing cases in which alien plaintiffs relied on
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Thus, before a court may adjudicate an ATCA claim it must be satis-
fied that the legal standard it is to apply is universally accepted." 5 While
the dictionary defines "universally" as something occurring "in every in-
stance" or "in every part or place,"'' 6 modern courts have applied a
somewhat less restrictive meaning."7 Accordingly, unanimity among na-
tions is not required to meet the burden of universality; rather, plaintiffs
need only "show a general recognition among states that a specifric [sic]
practice is prohibited.""' 8 One court described universality as requiring a
showing that "no state condone[s] the act in question and there is a rec-
ognizable 'universal' consensus of prohibition against it."" 9 Hence, de-
termining universality in the ATCA context requires a federal district
court judge to decide to what extent the nations of the international
community tolerate a challenged act or practice.
The remaining prongs seem to be vestiges of universality, rather than
distinct issues.' 2' "Definable," thus demands universal consensus' 22 by
requiring a showing of international agreement on the specific elements
of the tort.'" Similarly, the "obligatory" prong demands that the world
community expressly require the prohibition of a specific practice; there-
fore, courts will not take cognizance of international norms that are sim-
ply encouraged or advisory.
24
the ATCA to sue current and former public officials of their own governments).
115. See, e.g., Ford 1, 672 F. Supp. at 1542.
116. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DIcTIONARY 1460 (3d College ed. 1988).
117. See, e.g., Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707, 709 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (Forti 11).
118. Id.
119. Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 184 (D. Mass. 1995).
120. See supra notes 111-19 and accompanying text (discussing judicial application of
the universality prong).
121. Cf Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 187 ("[T]he requirement of universality goes not only
to recognition of the norm in the abstract sense, but to agreement upon its content as
well."). But see id. ("It is not necessary that every aspect of what might comprise a stan-
dard such as 'cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment' be fully defined and universally
agreed upon before a given action meriting the label is clearly proscribed under interna-
tional law.").
122. See Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 184; Forti II, 694 F. Supp. at 712.
123. See Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1543 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (Forti I).
Merely incorporating all the factual allegations of a claim and then alleging that the acts
constitute a violation of customary international law will not suffice. See Forti H, 694 F.
Supp. at 711.
124. See Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 93, at 89. Courts and commentators often as-
sess the extent of the obligation imposed by looking at the number of international agree-
ments, as well as the number of states that have joined them. See id. The "obligatory"
prong may present a difficult hurdle for plaintiffs with novel claims seeking recognition of
emerging norms that have not yet coalesced into law because "[tihe United States, has a
singularly poor record of ratifying [] human rights treaties." GUIDE, supra note 55, at 18
n.3 (listing treaties to which the United States is a party).
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Applying this contemporary standard, courts have recognized eight
torts as violations of the law of nations: torture, ' summary execution,'26
127 1228 13genocide, war crimes, disappearance, arbitrary detention, slave
trading, 3' and cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment.32 Conversely,
courts have held that the law of nations does not confer jurisdiction for
the following acts: environmental harms,'33 theft,' seizure or expropria-135 136
tion of property,"' supporting armed forces, and several labor rights
125. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881-85 (2d Cir. 1980).
126. See In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467,
1475 (9th Cir. 1994).
127. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 241-42 (2d Cir. 1995).
128. See id. at 242-43.
129. See Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707, 711 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (Forti II).
130. See Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 184-85 (D. Mass. 1995).
131. See John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 892 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
132. See Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 187-89.
133. See Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668, 669-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(dismissing ATCA claim involving the international shipment of hazardous materials for
want of a "clear ... violation of the law of nations"). More recently, the same court
seemed willing to consider conferring ATCA jurisdiction for environmental harms arising
from "a massive industrial undertaking extending over a substantial period of time and
with major consequences." Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., No. 93.CIV.7527, 1994 WL 142006, at
*1, *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1994) (Broderick, J.) (permitting limited discovery on allegations
of environmental abuse made by Ecuadorian citizens against U.S. based oil company,
Texaco), vacated sub nom., Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998). After the
death of District Judge Broderick, however, District Judge Rakoff dismissed the case, ob-
serving that "plaintiffs' imaginative view of this Court's power must face the reality that
United States district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. While their power within
those limits is substantial, it does not include a general writ to right the world's wrongs."
Aquinda v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 625, 627-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (dismissing on forum
non conveniens and comity grounds, and for failure to join the Ecuadorian government
and a state entity as indispensable parties), vacated sub nom., Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d
153 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that the district court erred in dismissing the case without re-
quiring the corporate defendant to accept jurisdiction in Ecuador). Cf infra notes 209-11
(citing recent literature discussing the emergence of international environmental standards
upon which courts might predicate ATCA jurisdiction).
134. See Hamid v. Price Waterhouse, 51 F.3d 1411, 1418 (9th Cir. 1995).
135. See Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 899 (clarifying an order dismissing expropriation of
property claim); see also Bigio v. Coca-Cola, Co., No. 97 Civ. 2858, 1998 WL 293990, at *2
n.4 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 1998).
136. See Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 208-09 (D.C. Cir. 1985). In San-
chez-Espinoza, then-Circuit Judge Scalia affirmed the district court's dismissal of ATCA
claims brought by Nicaraguan citizens against United States federal officials. See id. at
205-06. The Nicaraguan plaintiffs asserted that the federal defendants conspired to pro-
vide financial, technical, and military training support to Nicaraguan Contras attempting
to destabilize and overthrow the Nicaraguan Government. See id. at 205. Judge Scalia,
citing Judge Bork's concurrence in Tel-Oren, concluded that the ATCA would not reach
private, non-state support of military forces, nor, absent a waiver of sovereign immunity,
would it encompass official state action supporting military forces. See id. at 206-07.
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violations.'37
3. Finding the "Mystic Over-Law to Which Even the United States Must
Bow": Sources of the Law of Nations 8
As a practical matter, courts look first to written works, such as inter-
national treaties and agreements, in determining whether a particular
tort is universal, definable, and obligatory."' Some commentators sug-
gest that the number of agreements coupled with the number of states
that have signed them provide persuasive authority on which to base
ATCA jurisdiction.'4 Courts find additional evidence of the universal
status of a particular violation by looking to other written works such as
the rulings of international commissions and tribunals, the Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States [Restatement],
scholarly writing and affidavits, and international resolutions and decla-
rations. 1
Customary international law, however, extends beyond written, legally
ratified agreements and encompasses rules to which states conform in
practice "because they believe that they are under a normative obligation
Scalia concluded further that "[tihe Alien Tort Statute itself is not a waiver of sovereign
immunity." Id. at 207.
137. See Khedivial Line, S.A.E. v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 278 F.2d 49, 51-52 (2d Cir.
1960) (finding that picketing did not violate the law of nations). For an excellent discus-
sion of the ATCA's potential for vindication of transnational labor rights, see Sarah H.
Cleveland, Global Labor Rights and the Alien Tort Claims Act, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1533,
1561-79 (1998) (reviewing HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL
TRADE (Lance A. Compa & Stephen F. Diamond eds. 1996)).
138. In re The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419, 432 (1922) (Holmes, J.) ("There is no mys-
tic over-law to which even the United States must bow."). In an earlier case, Justice
Holmes observed "the general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as
lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is
done." American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909).
139. See Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 93, at 87-90. But see infra Part II.C.2 (dis-
cussing the Unocal court's failure to cite any international instruments in support of its
finding of ATCA jurisdiction).
140. See Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 93, at 87-90.
141. See STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 22, at 54-58. In this regard, some commen-
tators and jurists have concluded that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which
purportedly "defin[es] the fundamental rights to which all individuals are entitled," has
become in its entirety a binding part of customary international law. See Memorandum
for the United States Submitted to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Filartiga
v. Pena-Irala, 19 I.L.M. 585, 592 (1980), reprinted in David Cole et al., Interpreting the
Alien Tort Statute: Amicus Curiae Memorandum of International Law Scholars and Prac-
tioniers in Trajano v. Marcos, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 34, 39 (1988). But
see HUNTINGTON, supra note 17, at 192-98 (arguing that recent declines in Western eco-
nomic power have diminished the importance and acceptance of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights).
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to comply."142 Courts interpret these rules as jus cogens norms, which are
internationally accepted principles of law from which the nations of the
world, supposedly, permit no derogation. Jus cogens violations consist
of "a handful of heinous actions" that transgress "definable, universal
and obligatory norms. 1 4 4 While these norms may be determined by con-
sulting widely ratified treaties , courts today, as in the time of La Jeune
Eugenie and The Paquete Habana, often ascertain the content of custom-
146
ary international law largely by looking to state practice.
142. GUIDE, supra note 55, at 10.
143. See Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 940
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art.
53, U.N.Doc. A/Conf. 39/27, 8 I.L.M. 679); 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 (1987) (hereinafter RESTATEMENT).
The Restatement lists seven violations of jus cogens norms:
(a) A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices,
encourages, or condones
(b) genocide,
(c) slavery or slave trade,
(d) the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals,
(e) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment,
(f) prolonged arbitrary detention,
(g) systematic racial discrimination, or
(h) a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human
rights.
Id. Of course, the phrase "internationally recognized human rights" poses the same inter-
pretational problems as the ATCA's language "tort ... in violation of the law of nations,"
however, the Restatement incorporates explicitly an evolving standard into its text. See id.
§ 702 cmt. a.
144. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards,
J., concurring).
145. Compare generally Arthur M. Weisburd, Customary International Law: The
Problem of Treaties, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 5-6, 45 (1988) (arguing "that treaties
are simply one more form of state practice" that often do not reflect the actual practice of
states and, therefore, have limited value in ascertaining the customary international law of
human rights), with Anthony D'Amato, Custom and Treaty: A Response to Professor
Weisburd, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 459 (1988) (arguing that treaties are particularly
important in the context of customary international human rights law).
146. Compare United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 845-51 (C.C.D. Mass.
1822) (No. 15,551) (examining the long-standing moral proscription and more recent
European conventions abolishing slavery), and The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 686-
711 (1900) (surveying over 400 years of state practice regarding the capture of fishing ves-
sels as prizes of war), with Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239-241 (2d Cir. 1995) (review-
ing state practices related to war crimes, torture, and genocide), and Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883-85 (2d Cir. 1980) (analyzing the development of state practices re-
garding the use of torture).
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C. Implications of Looking to State Practice: State Action, Acts of State,
and Foreign Sovereign Immunity
1. State Action & "Color of Law"
Judicial reliance on state practice is consistent with the traditional view
of the law of nations as primarily a law between states,'47 establishing
"substantive principles for determining whether one country has
wronged another,"'48 rather than creating liability or rights of action for
private actors.9 Modern ATCA jurisprudence holds, however, that the
law of nations does not always "confine its reach to state action."'' 0 Ac-
cording to this jurisprudence, private individuals may also be liable for
certain violations of the law of nations including genocide, war crimes,
piracy, and slavery, regardless of whether they act under color of state
law." ' Nevertheless, courts interpret all other violations of the law of na-
tions as having a state action requirement."' Therefore, norms associ-
ated with violations other than genocide, war crimes, piracy, and slavery
are binding only upon states and persons acting under color of state law,
not private individuals.
5
1
Courts apply the constitutional standards derived from the "color of
law" jurisprudence of 42 U.S.C. § 1983,54 a domestic civil rights statute,
147. See 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 19 (H. Lauterpacht
ed., 7th ed. 1948).
148. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 422 (1964).
149. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 147, at 19. The underlying rationale of this approach
is that
[s]ince the Law of Nations is based on the common consent of individual States,
States are the principal subjects of International Law. This means that the Law
of Nations is primarily a law for the international conduct of States, and not of
their citizens. As a rule, the subjects of the rights and duties arising from the Law
of Nations are States solely and exclusively.
Id. Until Filartiga, conventional jurisprudence excluded a state's treatment of its own citi-
zens as a violation of the law of nations. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880 (observing that the
district court felt constrained by previous dicta to narrowly construe the law of nations as
excluding any law that governed a state's treatment of its own citizens). Thus, historically,
an alien could not historically sue officials of his own country under the ATCA no matter
how egregious the conduct alleged. Cf Burley, supra note 32, at 488 (observing that the
drafters could not have anticipated ATCA suits between aliens and officials of their own
government for torts committed in that government's jurisdiction).
150. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239-40.
151. See id. at 239-44.
152. See, e.g., id.; John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 890-92 (C.D. Cal.
1997); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 373-80 (E.D. La. 1997).
153. See Freeport-McMoRan, 969 F. Supp. at 373-74.
154. See supra text accompanying note 27 (introducing the application of the state ac-
tion requirement in the context of ATCA litigation). The application of § 1983 jurispru-
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to determine whether a defendant has engaged in state action for the
purposes of ATCA jurisdiction and liability.' Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a
private individual acts under color of law "when he acts together with
state officials or with significant state aid.' ' 6 The Supreme Court cases
deciding when courts may fairly ascribe private action to the state for
purposes of constitutional liability have not been, however, a model of
consistency.' Moreover, courts have developed the applicable standards
and definitions in a variety of domestic constitutional contexts unrelated
to the ATCA.'5 District courts, nevertheless, examine the conduct of
ATCA defendants using the four tests of state action emerging from the
U.S. Supreme Court's domestic civil rights jurisprudence:' public func-
dence to ATCA claims seems to have originated in Forti I. See Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672
F. Supp. 1531, 1546 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (Forti I). In Forti I, the court stated that "[c]laims for
tortious conduct of government officials under [the ATCA] may be analogized to domes-
tic lawsuits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, where plaintiffs must allege both deprivation
of a federally protected right and action 'under color of' state law." Id. Subsequent courts
accepted, without scrutiny, Forti's assertion that domestic constitutional standards were
applicable to relationships among foreign actors, both governmental and private. See, e.g.,
Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245; Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 890; Freeport-McMoRan, 969 F. Supp. at
375-76. This Comment argues, however, that standards of American constitutional liabil-
ity should not apply in the context of business relationships between U.S. corporations and
foreign nations arising out of economic globalization. See discussion infra Parts II.D and
III.
155. See, e.g., Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 890-891; Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245.
156. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245 (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937
(1982)).
157. See supra note 29 (regarding inconsistent Supreme Court jurisprudence sur-
rounding § 1983's "color of law" requirements).
158. See cases cited infra notes 160-63, 165-66; see also Freeport-McMoRan, 969 F.
Supp. at 375-80 (analogizing the facts and holdings of various non-ATCA § 1983 cases to a
corporate ATCA case). Section 1983 provides a remedy for governmental deprivations of
life, liberty, or property in violation of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment.
See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 347-49 (1974). The Restatement
also provides a "color of authority" test. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 143, § 207 cmt. d.
The Restatement test requires consideration of the totality of the circumstances, including
whether the challenged conduct was for private gain or public purpose, whether official
equipment or uniforms were used, and whether the actors reasonably considered their
conduct to be official. See id. Freeport-McMoRan, however, is the only corporate ATCA
case even to analyze tortious conduct under the Restatement test. See Freeport-McMoRan,
969 F. Supp. at 375.
159. See, e.g., Freeport-McMoRan, 969 F. Supp. at 380 (analyzing conduct of corporate
ATCA defendant under all four § 1983 tests of state action); John Doe I v. Unocal Corp.,
963 F. Supp. 880, 890-91 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (noting the applicability of the four § 1983 tests
of state action to ATCA claims). The Supreme Court has yet to resolve whether the vari-
ous tests operate differently or whether they are "simply different ways of characterizing
the necessarily fact-bound inquiry" confronting the courts. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,
457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982).
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163tion,16 symbiotic relationship,16' nexus,162 and joint action.
The joint action test is particularly relevant because the only court to
find ATCA jurisdiction over a corporate defendant applied that testl64
The joint action test posits that private actors can be state actors if they
willfully participate in joint action with a state to effect a particular dep-6-1 165
rivation of rights. Willful participation includes an agreement,66 con-
spiracy, 67 or a substantial degree of cooperative action between a private
168
actor and a state government.
2. Act of State Doctrine
In ATCA litigation targeting collusion between corporate defendants
and their foreign host-governments, the state action requirement is likelyS • 169
to trigger judicial consideration of the prudential act of state doctrine.
160. See, e.g., Jackson, 419 U.S. at 349-52. The public function test holds that a private
entity is a state actor when it performs an exclusive function of the state. See id. at 352.
161. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961). State action exists
if "[tihe [s]tate has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with a private
actor" that "it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity." Id. at
725. The Freeport-McMoRan court referred to the Burton standard as the "symbiotic rela-
tionship test." Freeport, 969 F. Supp. at 378. The Lugar Court, however, cited Burton as
applying the "'nexus' test." Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939.
162. See Jackson, 419 U.S. at 350-51. Under the nexus test, the plaintiff must demon-
strate that the nexus between the state and the private actor is sufficiently close to allow
the court to impute the challenged conduct to the state. See id. The state must be signifi-
cantly involved or have actually participated in the challenged conduct to satisfy the nexus
test. See Gallagher v. "Neil Young Freedom Concert," 49 F.3d 1442, 1449 (10th Cir. 1995).
163. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980). State action exists when a private
actor "is a willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents." Id. Courts find
joint action "if there is a 'substantial degree of cooperative action' between" the state and
private actors to deprive another of constitutional rights. Gallagher, 49 F.3d at 1454.
164. See Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 890-91 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (applying the joint action test
to find subject matter jurisdiction over corporate defendant under the ATCA).
165. See Dennis, 449 U.S. at 27.
166. See, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970) (holding that
proof that a private employee and police officer "somehow reached an understanding" to
violate petitioner's constitutional rights was basis for relief under § 1983). Mere acquies-
cence, however, in a federal investigative request by private employees is insufficient to
prove such an understanding or agreement. See Fonda v. Gray, 707 F.2d 435, 437-38 (9th
Cir. 1983).
167. See, e.g., Carmichael v. United Techs. Corp., 835 F.2d 109, 113-14 (5th Cir. 1988)
(assuming that conspiracy constitutes willful participation).
168. See, e.g., Gallagher, 49 F.3d at 1452.
169. See Debra A. Harvey, Comment, The Alien Tort Statute: International Human
Rights Watchdog or Simply "Historical Trivia"?, 21 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 341, 352-55
(1988) (discussing the use of abstention doctrines such as act of state and political question
in ATCA litigation).
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In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,"70 the U.S. Supreme Court
stated that the act of state doctrine prevents U.S. courts from inquiring
into the legitimacy of public acts committed by a recognized foreign sov-
ereign power within its own territory.171 The constitutional underpin-
nings of this doctrine reflect the judiciary's concerns regarding separation
of powers, particularly that U.S. courts sitting in judgment of a foreign
state may be interfering with the conduct of foreign policy by the Presi-
dent and Congress.
172
The scope and purpose of the act of state doctrine in the context of al-
leged human rights violations is tempered, however, by dictum from
Sabbatino.' The Sabbatino Court noted that if a particular area of in-
ternational law attracted a greater degree of codification or consensus,
then it would be more appropriate for the judiciary to render decisions
related to that concern.174 Hence, when jurisdiction is otherwise available
for violations of authoritative and well-documented norms, such as tor-
ture and slavery, modern courts have not felt constrained by the act of
state doctrine.
3. Foreign Sovereign Immunity
Plaintiffs rarely sue foreign governments, however, because, with few
exceptions, foreign states have complete immunity.17 The sole means for
170. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
171. See id. at 423-27.
172. See id. at 423-37. While neither the Constitution nor international law compel the
use of the act of state doctrine, it arises out of constitutional separation of powers and the
notion that the judiciary is the branch of government least competent to engage in interna-
tional relations. See id. at 423.
173. See id. at 428.
174. See id. The Ninth Circuit has conditioned application of the doctrine on whether
it is apparent that adjudication of a claim "would bring our country into a hostile confron-
tation" with another, Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1360 (9th Cir.
1988), and "whether the foreign state was acting in the public interest," Liu v. Republic of
China, 892 F.2d 1419,1432 (9th Cir. 1989). The doctrine applies only to "public acts" and,
in theory, no state commits human rights violations as a matter of public policy, therefore,
the judiciary should not consider such conduct a "public act." See S. REP. NO. 102-249, at
8 (1991) (Senate report on the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991). In its most recent
foray into the act of state doctrine, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a ruling on the va-
lidity of a sovereign official's act would occur if "the outcome of the case turns upon [] the
effect of official action by a foreign sovereign." W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v. Environ-
mental Tectonics Corp., Int'l, 493 U.S. 400, 406 (1990).
175. See, e.g., John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 892-95 (C.D. Cal. 1997)
(holding that the policies underlying the act of state doctrine militate against its applica-
tion in cases where, inter alia, the coordinate branches of government have previously de-
nounced the human rights abuses of a foreign nation).
176. See STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 22, at 126.
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obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in this country is the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA).1 7 Under the FSIA, foreign
states are immune from suit and federal courts lack subject matter juris-
diction over claims against them, unless one of the FSIA's enumerated
exceptions applies.178
The exceptions to jurisdictional immunity focus on commercial activity
occurring or causing a direct effect in the United States.179 A foreign
government engages in commercial activity when it acts not as a market
regulator, but rather as a private participant.8 ° Courts test for commer-
cial activity by determining whether the foreign state "exercises 'only
those powers that can also be exercised by private citizens,' as distinct
from those 'powers peculiar to sovereigns."''" While commercial collu-
sion between a corporation and its foreign host-government intuitively
seems to fit within an FSIA exception, a foreign state's abuse of police or
penal powers in support of commercial endeavors may not destroy im-
munity. 2
D. The ATCA Paradox: Who Gets Left Holding the Bag?
The effect of invoking foreign sovereign immunity while at the same
time finding the act of state doctrine inapplicable to state action involv-
ing a corporate ATCA case yields an interesting paradox. Such a judg-
ment holds corporate defendants liable for the conduct of foreign host-
177. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (1994 & Supp. II 1996); see Argentine Republic v. Amerada
Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 431-32, 443 (1989) (reversing Second Circuit decision
arising out of military attack on neutral commercial shipping during the Falklands War on
the grounds that the FSIA was the only means of establishing jurisdiction over a foreign
nation).
178. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604-05. Section 1605(a)(2) provides exceptions for (1) com-
mercial activity carried on in the United States by a foreign state, (2) acts performed in the
United States connected to the foreign state's commercial activity elsewhere, or (3) com-
mercial activity of a foreign state occurring overseas but having a "direct effect" in the
United States. See id. § 1605(a)(2). Additionally, the FSIA provides several other general
exceptions to immunity including waiver, cases involving property in or connected with
the United States, and certain cases in admiralty. See id. § 1605. Even if a foreign state
does not enter an appearance or assert an immunity defense, a court must satisfy itself that
one of the enumerated exceptions applies before taking any other action. See Siderman
de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 706 (9th Cir. 1992).
179. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
180. See Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992).
181. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 360 (1993).
182. See John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 887-89 (C.D. Cal. 1997). For
example, Burma's use of military troops to forcibly enslave and relocate local farmers in
the path of a commercial gas pipeline was an act "peculiarly sovereign in nature" and,
thus, did not come wvithin the FSIA's commercial activity exception. Id. at 888 (internal
quotations omitted).
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governments for which the foreign governments, themselves, are im-183
mune. Likewise, before the court may adjudicate the claim, it must be
satisfied that the legal standard it is to apply is universally accepted. 14 A
court finding ATCA jurisdiction in such a case, therefore, expressly holds
that "no state condones" the tortious conduct in question,185 while at the
same time accepting as true, allegations of foreign government complic-
ity in that conduct.
1 86
II. RACE TO THE BOrrOM: THE GLOBAL TENSION BETWEEN PROFITS
AND PRINCIPLES
A. Fatal Attraction: Multinational Corporations and Their Foreign Host-
Governments
In a growing number of ATCA suits, indigenous people are alleging
corporate complicity in human rights abuses committed on and near
company oil and mining operations by the military and police forces of
foreign governments. 187 These cases typically arise out of mutually bene-
ficial business relationships between military dictatorships and MNCs.18
The MNC defendants assert that in their search for finite resources, "ge-
ology and geography[,] not geopolitics", compel their choice of foreign
government business partners. Many factors, however, draw MNCs to
183. See, e.g., Pizzurro & Delaney, supra note 22.
184. See supra notes 115-37 and accompanying text (discussing the universality re-
quirement).
185. Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 184 (D. Mass. 1995).
186. See Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 887-91 (dismissing slavery claims against Burmese
government entity on the basis of foreign sovereign immunity, but accepting allegations of
state sponsored slavery as true to allow the case to go forward against the private corpo-
rate defendant).
187. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 Civ. 8386, slip op. at 2 (S.D.N.Y.
Sep. 25, 1998); Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 884-85; Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F.
Supp. 362, 369 (E.D. La. 1997).
188. See infra Parts II.B-E (describing relationships between corporations and their
foreign host-governments that led to ATCA litigation).
189. See Constructive Engagement in Myanmar: Hearings on S. 1511 Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking, 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of John Imle, President of Unocal
Corp.) (last visited Feb. 19, 1999) <http://www.mrdltd.com/usviews/Files/testimony.html>
[hereinafter Statement of John Imle]. Senate consideration of the Burma Freedom and
Democracy Act of 1995 motivated Mr. Imle's testimony. See id. A military junta has
ruled Burma since 1962. See Burma Freedom and Democracy Act of 1995, S. 1511, 104th
Cong. § 2 (1995). In an effort to repress the Burmese pro-democracy movement, the junta
established the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) in 1988. See id. In
1990, the people of Burma voted in a free election for the National League for Democracy
(NLD) led by Aung San Suu Kyi. See id. SLORC refused to respect the outcome of the
1990 elections. See id. The Burma Freedom and Democracy Act of 1995 sought to impose
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nations with dismal human rights records.19°
It is undisputed that MNCs benefit from the labor, economic, and en-
vironmental policies of abusive foreign host-governments.'9 ' The host-
governments, likewise, benefit from both the international prestige of
collaborating with powerful MNCs and the much-needed revenue gener-
ated by their presence.' 92 That revenue, however, often finances repres-
sive armies and police forces that are essential if an abusive government
is to stay in power.' 93 Thus, "large, visible investment in often desper-
ately poor countries" often attracts the attention of dissident and revolu-
tionary groups pursuing economic and social rights.94 Similarly, the cor-
ruption and poor labor practices that often attend development in
emerging economies frequently generate intense domestic opposition. 95
certain unilateral and multilateral economic sanctions against Burma to compel SLORC
to step aside and permit the elected government of Burma to take power. See id. §§ 3-4.
The bill, which Congress never passed, required the Secretary of Labor to report to the
appropriate congressional committees on Burma's unfair labor practices. See id. § 5. Mr.
Imle, the President of Unocal, opposed passage of the bill arguing that it would "diminish
[the United States's] ability to influence constructively the future of Southeast Asia and
cede the opportunity to participate in the formative stages of Myanmar's development."
Statement of John Imle, supra.
190. See MARBER, supra note 1, at 87-104 (discussing the benefits MNCs obtain by
operating in emerging nations that do not value human rights).
191. See Jeff Manning, Nike Steps Into Political Minefield, OREGONIAN, Nov. 11, 1997,
at Al (citing Professor David Kang of Dartmouth College). According to the World
Bank, "foreign direct investment [, a measure of] capital, plant, and equipment going
abroad[,] swelled from approximately $20.5 billion in 1987 to an estimated $100 billion in
1997." MARBER, supra note 1, at 95-96. Likewise, observers estimated that investment in
manufacturing in emerging nations totaling $56 billion in 1995 would grow to a projected
$90 billion in 1997. See id. at 96.
192. See Arvind Ganesan, Industry Focus: Partners in Crime, GUARDIAN, May 20,
1998, Society, at 4.
193. See Leyla Alyanak, Activists Awry Over Gas Pipeline Running Through Old Thai
Forest (visited Sept. 3, 1998) <http://www.earthtimes.org/aug/environmentactivistsawry
aug19_98.htm> (discussing the extent to which Unocal's funding of the Yadana pipeline
project on the Burma/Thailand border is propping up SLORC's military regime) (on file
with the Catholic University Law Review).
194. Vidal, supra note 4, at 5. Disenfranchised indigenous groups have found that at-
tacking a corporate financed mine or pipeline project, for example, is an effective way to
destabilize the government business partner. See id.; see also Justin Lowe, Rumble in the
Jungle, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 10, 1998) <http://www.motherjones.com/newswire/lowe.
html> (arguing that foreign economic development projects must be opposed because
they should benefit the poor, but actually benefit only multinational corporations and the
very rich).
195. See MARBER, supra note 1, at 207-08 (discussing the accusations, public outcry,
and unintended consequences surrounding allegations of "sweatshop" labor practices);
Fred Hiatt, Why Democracies Matter, WASH. POST, July 28, 1996, at C7 (eschewing the
Association of South East Asian Nations' (ASEAN) argument that its business and labor
practices do not constitute corruption, but rather are cultural characteristics); Vidal, supra
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To protect their investments in high-risk nations, corporations sometimes
make contractual security and labor arrangements with host-
governments known to be among the worst violators of human rights in
the world. 9 The recent spate of ATCA cases explores the contours of
liability when MNCs knowingly benefit from a governmental business
partner's violation of the human rights of its own citizens.' 97
B. The Midas Touch: Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc.' 98
In Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., an Indonesian tribal leader filed
an ATCA suit in United States district court against a Louisiana-based
gold and copper mining corporation, Freeport-McMoRan (Freeport).' 99
The complaint alleged that Freeport committed environmental and hu-
man rights abuses at its mine in Irian Jaya, Indonesia.' Moreover, the
plaintiff asserted that Freeport's environmental practices amounted to
genocide because the practices were bringing about the physical destruc-
tion of the Amungme tribe.'O
Freeport has long-term mining rights granted by the Indonesian gov-
ernment, a major shareholder in Freeport's Indonesian subsidiary and
note 4, at 5.
196. See discussion infra Parts II.B-E (describing the relationships between several
corporations and their host-governments that have led to recent ATCA claims).
197. See supra note 20 (listing recent corporate ATCA cases).
198. 969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La. 1997) dismissed with prejudice, No. CIV.A.96-1474,
1998 WL 92246 (E.D. La. Mar. 3, 1998). For extensive background information on this
case, see generally, US Mining Corporation Sued in Federal Court by Indonesian Tribal
Leader, 1996 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 89 (1997) [hereinafter US Mining] (pub-
lished before dismissal of the suit).
199. See Freeport-McMoRan, 969 F. Supp. at 365-66.
200. See id. Thomas Beanal, chairman of the Amungme Tribal Council, filed a class
action suit against Freeport on behalf of himself and 3,000 indigenous people. See id.; US
Mining, supra note 198, at 89. Freeport owns 82% of its subsidiary, PT Freeport Indone-
sia, which in turn owns 90% of the mine. See US Mining, supra note 198, at 91. The Indo-
nesian Government owns 10% of the Freeport mining operation, which is valued at 60 bil-
lion dollars. See id. The class was never certified and Beanal remained the lone plaintiff
throughout the suit. See Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., No. CIV.A.96-1474 1998 WL
92246, at *1 (E.D. La. Mar. 3, 1998) (dismissing claims with prejudice due to failure to
amend complaint after three opportunities).
201. See Freeport-McMoRan, 969 F. Supp. at 372-73. Beanal alleged that Freeport dis-
charged huge amounts of hazardous mine tailings into a nearby river, thereby destroying
the natural resources necessary for the tribe's survival. See id. at 382-83; see also US Min-
ing, supra note 198, at 92-93 (describing claims that Freeport's actions threatened the
physical survival of the Indonesian people). The complaint alleged that Freeport's envi-
ronmental practices resulted in displacement, relocation and "purposeful, deliberate, con-
trived and planned" demise of a culture of indigenous people. Freeport-McMoRan, 969 F.
Supp. at 369.
202. See Freeport-McMoRan, 969 F. Supp. at 379.
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a prominent source of corporate income.03 The court acknowledged that
the complaint depicted "Freeport's vast and draconian control" over the
region. 04 The corporation allegedly maintained this control, in part,
through the assistance of an Indonesian military presence at the mine 0 5
These official Indonesian troops were apparently distinct, however, from
the additional security personnel privately employed by the corpora-
tion.'06 These privately employed security forces allegedly abducted, de-
tained, and tortured Amungme tribesmen on corporate property. °
1. The Lack of Universal Consensus Regarding Environmental Torts
The willingness of the Freeport-McMoRan court to consider environ-
mental damage as a potential violation of human rights may be one rea-
son why it gave the plaintiff three opportunities to amend his complaint2 6
and considerable guidance in making the amendments.20 9 Existing inter-
national environmental principles, however, merely express a general
sense that nations take care to ensure that internal state practice does not
203. See id. at 378-79.
204. Id. at 380.
205. See id. at 379.
206. See id. at 378.
207. See id. at 369, 380. The challenged conduct allegedly occurred on buses, within
workshops, at security stations, on private roadways, and in containers owned by Freeport.
See id.
208. Cf Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., No. CIV.A.96-1474, 1998 WL 92246, at
*1 (E.D. La. Mar. 3,1998) (dismissing plaintiff's third amended complaint with prejudice);
Beanal v. Freeport McMoRan, Inc., No. CIV.A.96-1474, 1997 WL 465283, at *1 (E.D. La.
Aug. 7, 1997) (dismissing second amended complaint without prejudice); Freeport-
McMoRan, 969 F. Supp. at 383. The litigation was contentious and hotly contested. See
Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., No. CIV.A.96-1474, 1996 WL 371835, at *2-*3 (E.D.
La. Jul. 3, 1996) (granting Freeport's Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions against Beanal's attor-
ney, Martin Regan).
209. See Freeport-McMoRan, 969 F. Supp. at 383 ("As a preliminary matter, courts
have recognized that § 1350 may be applicable to international environmental torts."); see
also Freeport-McMoRan, 1998 WL 92246, at *3 (E.D. La. Mar. 3, 1998) (asserting that
"[tihe court undertook a thorough analysis" of the first complaint, and in later Orders
"provided plaintiff a road map as to the type of allegations which might survive a motion
to dismiss" and gave still "more guidance" with which the plaintiff did not comply). For
an excellent analysis of the international legal principles underlying the environmental
claims in Freeport-McMoRan see, Anastasia Khokhryakova, Note, Beanal v. Freeport-
McMoRan, Inc.: Liability of a Private Actor For an International Environmental Tort Un-
der the Alien Tort Claims Act, 9 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 463, 479-88 (1998).
For a detailed proposal to expand remedies available to indigenous people for environ-
mental torts arising out of corporate activity, see generally Martin A. Geer, Foreigners in
Their Own Land: Cultural Land and Transnational Corporations-Emergent International
Rights and Wrongs, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 331 (1998).
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harm the environment beyond their borders. ° Consequently, neither
the court nor the plaintiff was able to identify, absent state action, any
germane universal norm in customary international law that could estab-
lish private corporate ATCA liability for environmental practices harm-
ful to an indigenous tribe."'
Unable to find sufficient consensus to claim an environmental tort in
violation of the law of nations and, perhaps, seeking to avoid the state
action requirement, Beanal apparently attempted to characterize the en-
vironmental damage as genocide.1 2 Genocide, however, encompasses
210. See PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW I:
FRAMEWORKS, STANDARDS AND IMPLEMENTATION 186-93 (1995). Professor Sands
finds that Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration and Principle 2 of the Rio Declara-
tion provide the "legal bas[es] for bringing claims under customary [international] law as-
serting liability for environmental damage." Id. at 186, 194. Cf. Marcia Coyle, Suits Test
Environmental Jurisdiction, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 8, 1999, at B1. Ms. Coyle reports on recent
developments in federal corporate ATCA cases attempting to establish a clear set of
binding international environmental standards. See id. In Ms. Coyle's article, John C.
Reynolds, corporate defense counsel to Freeport-McMoRan argues that "'sovereign na-
tions . . . have never agreed to [international environmental principles] and have never
delineated any standards."' Id. While David Hunter, vice president of the Center for In-
ternational Environmental Law contends that courts can fashion standards out of treaties,
World Bank policy statements, and non-binding declarations, he acknowledges that "'[t]he
basic problem is, we don't have a set of international environmental standards as clearly
binding and articulated as in the human rights area." Id.
211. See Freeport-McMoRan, 969 F. Supp. at 382-84. Beanal asserted three interna-
tional environmental law principles to support his cause of action: 1) the Polluter Pays
Principle, 2) the Precautionary Principle, and 3) the Proximity Principle. See id. at 383-84.
The Freeport-McMoRan court, however, rejected these principles because these standards
had not garnered universal consensus in the international community, and because they
applied only to state actors. See id. at 384. For a discussion of international agreements
related to a human "right to a safe environment" in the context of MNC operations among
indigenous peoples, see Geer, supra note 209, at 377-84. While Professor Geer concludes
that the "right to a safe environment" has yet to achieve the status of customary interna-
tional law, he observes a growing trend toward recognizing environmental rights in the
context of international human rights norms. See id. at 384. But see Hari M. Osofsky, En-
vironmental Human Rights Under the Alien Tort Statute: Redress for Indigenous Victims of
Multinational Corporations, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 335, 343-44 (1997) (argu-
ing "that human rights protection against severe environmental harm has developed suffi-
ciently to allow for relief under the [ATCA]").
212. See Freeport-McMoRan, 969 F. Supp. at 371, 382-84. While the court recognized
that state action is not required for an allegation of genocide, it dismissed the claim relying
on definitions found in the Convention of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Genocide Convention). See id. at 371-72 (citing the Genocide Convention, 78
U.N.T.S. 277). The Genocide Convention defines genocide as the intentional destruction
of a group, generally through acts of extreme violence. See id. at 372. Thus, the court em-
phasized that only deliberate acts committed by Freeport with the intent to destroy the
Amungme people, rather than their culture, would be sufficient to state a claim for geno-
cide under international law. See id. at 373. After giving the plaintiff two opportunities to
amend his complaint to allege state action, the district court dismissed the claim with
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deliberate violence aimed at eradicating a race of people,213 not reckless
• 211
efforts to make a profit by engaging in poor environmental practices.
The Freeport-McMoRan court observed that, as long as Freeport did not
intend to destroy the people of the Amungme Tribe, the law of nations
did not proscribe its detrimental environmental conduct, regardless of
the consequences. 2" Further, the existing international consensus on en-
vironmental damage216 gives states "the sovereign right to exploit their
own resources"'217 in following their own environmental and developmen-
tal policies.2' Thus, as long as host-government business partners, like
Indonesia, refrain from regulating these practices to encourage foreign
investment, it seems unlikely that the requisite state practice or universal
consensus against environmental torts will emerge.2 1 9
prejudice. See Freeport-McMoRan, 1998 WL 92246, at *3. The court found the amended
complaints too general because the plaintiff failed to state what happened to him person-
ally as the injured party, instead making only a "superficial effort" to personalize the com-
plaint by "pepper[ing] his own name" throughout. Id. at *1.
213. See Freeport-McMoRan, 969 F. Supp. at 372 (quoting Convention on the Preven-
tion and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S. 277).
214. See Khokhryakova, supra note 209, at 477-79.
215. See Freeport-McMoRan, 969 F. Supp. at 373 & n.7 (noting that "[g]enocide is a
specific intent offense" and that proof of genocide requires that the defendant committed
certain acts with the intent to destroy an ethnic group); see also Geer, supra note 209, at
395-96 (arguing that MNCs operating in Amazonia have not displayed the requisite intent
to support a charge of genocide under customary international law); Khokhryakova, supra
note 209, at 477-79 (predicting that Beanal is unlikely to succeed on appeal with an argu-
ment equating environmental crimes with genocide). In Freeport-McMoRan, the corpora-
tion allegedly dumped forty million tons of untreated and toxic mine tailings into the
Ajkwa River during 1996. See US Mining, supra note 198, at 92. This practice led to
flooding, alteration of the river's course, damage to the drinking water supply, and in-
creased health problems for the local population. See id. The Government of Indonesia
has little incentive to regulate the practice, however, because its revenue from the mine in
the same year was approximately $480 million. See id. at 93.
216. See Khokhryakova, supra note 209, at 485-88 (discussing Principle 21 of the
Stockholm Convention and Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration); see also Osofsky, supra
note 211, at 368-81 (providing a thorough discussion of potential sources of international
environmental law that may yield subject matter jurisdiction under the ATCA).
217. Report of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
48/14, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416, 1420 (1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration].
218. See Report of the U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Decla-
ration, U.N. Doc. AIConf.151/5/Rev.1 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 876 [hereinafter Rio
Declaration].
219. Cf. Khokhryakova, supra note 209, at 478 (predicting that Beanal will be unsuc-
cessful on appeal because of the difficulty in proving Freeport's intent to destroy the
Amungme people through the use of poor environmental practices).
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2. The State Action Defense
Acknowledging that "[c]orporations can represent the state,""22 the
Freeport-McMoRan court nevertheless dismissed the remainder of the
human rights claims because the facts alleged were insufficient to estab-
lish state action under any "color of law" test from the jurisprudence of
42 U.S.C. § 1983.22' Despite the presence of Indonesian troops at the
mine, the alien plaintiff failed to satisfy either the nexus or joint action
tests. 22 Beanal's failure to allege "whether the military personnel helped
enforce Freeport's policies or merely observed Freeport's private secu-
rity guards" violate tribe members' human rights was fatal to his nexus
argument.223 Similarly, the court similarly found that Beanal failed to es-
tablish sufficient facts to satisfy the symbiotic relationship test.214 In the
court's view, a long-term mining concession, conferred by a government
contract and supported by government investment, did not establish the
degree of physical and financial interdependence between Freeport and
225the government of Indonesia necessary to constitute state action. Fi-
nally, notwithstanding Freeport's "draconian" grasp over the region, the
plaintiff's failure to allege sufficient facts that the corporation had "taken
over the functions of regulating local life" also doomed the complaint
226under the public functions test.
The Freeport-McMoRan court's exhaustive discussion of the state ac-
tion requirement for the non-genocide related human rights claims 227
clearly exposes the dilemma caused by applying American standards of
constitutional liability in the context of globalized business relationships.
Despite an intimate commercial relationship between Freeport and the
228Indonesian Government, the alien plaintiff was unable to persuade the
court that Freeport knowingly benefited from the foreign regime's finan-
cial and military support.229 That result, however, is unsupported by the
220. Freeport-McMoRan, 969 F. Supp. at 376.
221. See id. at 377-80.
222. See id. at 378-79.
223. Id. at 378.
224. See id. at 379.
225. See id. at 378-79.
226. Id. at 379-80.
227. See id. at 373-80.
228. See supra notes 202-07 and accompanying text (detailing the comprehensive busi-
ness relationship between Indonesia and Freeport-McMoRan); infra notes 231-37 and ac-
companying text (arguing that Freeport-McMoRan and the Indonesian Government were
indispensable in each other's quest for profit).
229. See Freeport-McMoRan, 969 F. Supp. at 378-80. The court based its dismissal
primarily on the ambiguity in Beanal's allegations regarding the role played by the Indo-
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relationship between Freeport and its foreign host .3
As a result of that intimate commercial relationship, the Government
of Indonesia allowed Freeport to conduct environmentally damaging
mining operations on expropriated land in return for nearly one-half bil-
lion dollars in annual government profit.3t The Government of Indone-
sia chose not to regulate Freeport's abusive practices, of which it was
aware,232 and provided a military presence at the mine to secure its lucra-
tive investment. 233 Freeport was, therefore, an indispensable part of the
Indonesian Government's well-paying joint venture project, and the
Government was an equally indispensable part of Freeport's profit mar-
gin 3 4 Unfortunately, the Freeport-McMoRan court's formalistic ap-
proach to converting private conduct into state action focused on the role
of the military troops at the mine, rather than on the commercial rela-
tionship between Freeport and its host-government . In so doing, the
court failed to comprehend that the "substantial degree of cooperative
action ''236 involved in sustaining the long-term and economically interde-
nesian military at the Irian Jaya mine. See id. Only once in the opinion, however, did the
court analyze the contractual and economic relationship between Freeport and the Indo-
nesian Government as the basis for finding state action. See id. at 378-79 (applying the
"symbiotic relationship" test). While the allegations of Freeport's misconduct failed to
persuade the court, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) was convinced.
See US Mining, supra note 198, at 93-94 (describing OPIC's actions in response to
Freeport's overseas activities during 1995-96). In 1995, OPIC, which insures U.S. MNCs
against political upheaval in emerging nations, canceled Freeport's $100 million political
risk insurance policy after deciding that the mining operation "had gone beyond the scope
of its policy." Id. at 93. OPIC reinstated the policy in April 1996 following a positive audit
of the operation prepared by Dames and Moore. See id. Freeport subsequently canceled
its coverage, either as a routine business decision or because it desired to evade required
on-site inspections attending the coverage. See id. at 94.
230. See infra notes 231-37 and accompanying text (enumerating the various public
components of Freeport's relationship with the Indonesian host-government, including
mining rights, military support, and lax environmental regulation).
231. See US Mining, supra note 198, at 92-93.
232. See id. The Indonesian Ministry of Mines and Energy approved an environ-
mental impact assessment for the Irian Jaya site and it withstood in-country court chal-
lenges. See id. at 89, 92-93. Non-governmental organizations claim, however, that the
military government of Indonesia is simply not regulating environmental damage in order
to protect its substantial economic interest in the mine. See id. at 93.
233. See Freeport-McMoRan, 969 F. Supp. at 374-75 (alleging the presence of military
troops at the mine to assist Freeport in maintaining security).
234. See US Mining, supra note 198, at 94 (discussing the "cozy relationship" between
Freeport and the Government of Indonesia).
235. See Freeport-McMoRan, 969 F. Supp. at 378-80 (holding that Beanal's complaint
failed to satisfy three out of four state action tests because he failed to allege the role
played by military personnel in committing the challenged conduct).
236. Gallagher v. "Neil Young Freedom Concert," 49 F.3d 1442, 1454 (10th Cir. 1995)
(finding that a "substantial degree of cooperative action" between state and private actors
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pendent association between Indonesia and Freeport was sufficient to
satisfy both the symbiotic relationship and joint action tests. 2 37
Moreover, the court's dismissal of Beanal's complaint, for failure to
allege what role the Indonesian military played in committing human
rights abuses at the mine, yields a result that is incongruous with the
ATCA's intent. If the ATCA is to provide a remedy for aliens sub-
jected to tortious conduct by United States citizens at home or abroad,
then there is no reason to predicate jurisdiction on the involvement of
foreign agents" Indeed, the absence of host-government influence alle-
viates any Sabbatino-like concerns regarding the participation of U.S.
courts in foreign affairs.14' Accordingly, courts should not dismiss alien
tort claims against U.S.-based MNCs simply because of the uncertain
role played by foreign-state actors in the challenged conduct. Charac-
terizing detention, assault, and killing as private, rather than state, action
is simply not a principled basis for allowing a domestically chartered cor-
poration to evade liability for abusive overseas conduct.
C. The Ties That Bind: John Doe I v. Unocal Corp.241
While the Freeport-McMoRan court dismissed ATCA claims against a
corporate defendant because of the absence of state action, another court
allowed a case to proceed against a private MNC that did not actually
commit any torts itself, but that benefited from a foreign host-
government who did.242 Thus, in John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., a federal
district court in California applied 42 U.S.C. § 1983's joint action test and
in effecting a deprivation of rights constitutes state action).
237. Cf Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961) (holding that a
state is a joint participant in challenged activity when it "insinuate[s] itself into a position
of interdependence with" a private actor); Gallagher, 49 F.3d at 1454 (holding that state
action is present when there is a "substantial degree of cooperative action" between the
state and private actors in effecting the deprivation of constitutional rights or when the
state and private actors "share a common, unconstitutional goal").
238. See supra notes 32-49 and accompanying text (discussing the possible purposes of
the ATCA).
239. But see Freeport-McMoRan, 969 F. Supp. at 380 (concluding that the plaintiff's
failure to satisfy the ATCA's state action requirement by alleging specifically the role
played by foreign military forces in committing human rights abuses justified dismissal for
failure to state a claim).
240. See supra notes 169-75 (discussing the underlying policy concerns of the act of
state doctrine).
241. 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
242. Compare Freeport-McMoRan, 969 F. Supp. at 380 (dismissing ATCA claim for
failure to allege state action), with John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 896 (C.D.
Cal. 1997) (refusing to dismiss claim against corporate defendant who allegedly committed
no challenged conduct directly but who knew of or benefited from the human rights
abuses of the foreign host-government).
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held, for the first time, that the ATCA provided subject matter jurisdic-
tion in a human rights case involving a MNC defendant.243
In 1993, Unocal joined with the military government of Myanmar,
known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), in
developing the $1.2 billion Yadana natural gas pipeline project.2 4
SLORC had established an extensive system of slave labor for construc-
tion and infrastructure projects.2 45 Many MNCs, responding to world-
wide public pressure, withdrew from Myanmar 24 and, in 1995, Congress
and the Clinton Administration banned new investment 4l in the poor,
but "resource-rich," nation.24 The ban was not retroactive, however, and
Unocal, providing the single largest source of outside investment in
249Myanmar, continued its involvement with the Yadana pipeline project .
As part of an implied partnership agreement, Unocal provided venture
capital and expertise, while SLORC agreed to clear forests, and provide
labor, security, and material for the pipeline.2 0 The Unocal plaintiffs
sued SLORC and Unocal alleging that, in the course of the joint venture,
SLORC forcibly relocated, enslaved, and tortured thousands of Burmese
251farmers living along the pipeline route. SLORC allegedly forced male
farmers to work on the pipeline clearing trees, leveling forests, and per-
243. See id. at 891; Pizzurro &Delaney, supra note 22.
244. See Bencivenga, supra note 20, at 5; Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 884-85. The members
of the joint venture project included Unocal, Total S.A. (a French oil company), the mili-
tary government of Myanmar (also known as the State Law and Order Restoration Coun-
cil (SLORC)), and the state-owned Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE). See id.;
Pizzurro & Delaney, supra note 22.
245. See AMERICAN EMBASSY RANGOON, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
COUNTRY COMMERCIAL GUIDE: BURMA FISCAL YEAR 1998 (1997), available at
<http://www.flatrade.org/CCG/burma.HTM>; William Barnes, Escapees Tell of Pipeline's
Slave Labour, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 21, 1997, at 11, available in 1997 WL
13260844 [hereinafter COUNTRY COMMERCIAL GUIDE: BURMA]; Gregory J. Wallance,
Linked to Slavery, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 1, 1997, at 24 (analyzing and commenting on Uno-
cal). The American Embassy Rangoon euphemistically reported that SLORC "made in-
creasing use of uncompensated corvee labor on physical infrastructure construction proj-
ects." COUNTRY COMMERCIAL GUIDE: BURMA, supra.
246. See MARBER, supra note 1, at 215 (noting withdrawal by Pepsi, Macy's, Columbia
Sportswear, Carlsberg, and Heineken); see also Frey, supra note 15, at 180 (noting the
termination of business contracts with Burmese suppliers by Levi Strauss).
247. See Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Program Appropriations
Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 570, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-166 to 3009-167 (1996); Exec.
Order No. 13,047, 3 C.F.R. 202, 202-04 (1997).
248. See COUNTRY COMMERCIAL GUIDE: BURMA, supra note 245.
249. See Wallance, supra note 245.
250. See John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 885 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
251. See id.
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forming construction and porter labor."' Government officials, mean-
while, allegedly raped female family members that were left behind, and
seized the farmers' property.253 There was no allegation that Unocal, it-
254self, committed any tortious conduct. Instead, plaintiffs claimed that
SLORC committed all the acts alleged with Unocal's knowledge and
complicity.
2 15
1. The Court Leaves Unocal to Fend for Itself
The district court held that, in this case, the FSIA entitled SLORC tosvrin .. 256 ,.257
sovereign immunity. As discussed earlier, the Unocal court did not
construe SLORC's deployment of military and police forces along the
pipeline route as falling within the FSIA's commercial activity exception
because abuse of police power is "peculiarly sovereign in nature."258 Sub-
sequently, the court premised subject matter jurisdiction over the ATCA
claims remaining against Unocal on the plaintiff's allegations of "forced
labor and other human rights violations. '" 5 9 The court did not expressly
analyze, however, the allegations using the framework applied in Filar-
tiga and refined in later cases. 260 Rather, it simply asserted, without cita-
tion to authority, that forced labor violates jus cogens norms.261
Having established, or at least declared, subject matter jurisdiction, the
claim now confronted the court with the dilemma of finding state actionS 262
in the conduct of a private multinational corporate actor.2 The Unocal
court seemed to adopt a functional view of state action, rather than the
252. See id.
253. See id.
254. See id. at 896.
255. See id.
256. See id. at 888. The court also ruled that SLORC was not a necessary and indis-
pensable party for purposes of Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because,
even in the absence of the host-government defendants, the plaintiffs could still obtain
complete relief from Unocal. See id. at 889.
257. See supra Part I.C.3 (discussing commercial exceptions to the FSIA).
258. Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 888 (internal quotations omitted).
259. Id. at 891.
260. Compare id. at 890-92 (construing allegations of forced labor as participation in
slave trading, a violation of jus cogens norms, but citing no authority to support that
proposition), with Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883-85 (2d Cir. 1980) (analyzing
the development of state practices regarding the use of torture).
261. See id. at 890-91. The Unocal court observed that torture was a violation jus co-
gens norms, however it drew no specific analogy between torture and forced labor. See id.
262. See id. at 890. The court relied on dictum from earlier ATCA decisions to distin-
guish between those claims requiring state action and those that did not. See id. 891-92
(citing, for example, Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 791-95 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Edwards, J., concurring)).
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formalistic approach taken by the court in Freeport-McMoRan.16' Ac-
cordingly, the Unocal court found that a corporate defendant could be
liable under two distinct theories. 64 First, plaintiffs' claims of rape, tor-
ture, and summary execution alleged that SLORC acted as an agent of
Unocal to further their mutual interest in the pipeline project.2 65 The
court held that, if proven, this relationship would satisfy the joint action
test of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and, therefore, found the allegations sufficient to
establish subject matter jurisdiction under the ATCA.266
Alternatively, the court found the allegations of forced labor sufficient
to support subject matter jurisdiction against Unocal, even in the absence
of state action.26' The Unocal court performed some legal sleight of
268hand, however, in order to reach this holding. The court restated the
forced labor claim as a slave trading allegation 269 because the only way to
establish private actor liability in the absence of state action is to allege
one of "'the handful of crimes to which the law of nations attributes indi-
vidual responsibility. '' 2711 While the plaintiffs did not allege that SLORC
physically sold Burmese citizens to Unocal, the court found that the cor-
poration effectively treated SLORC as an "overseer. ''27 By virtue of the
facts that Unocal paid SLORC to provide labor and security for the
pipeline, accepted the benefit, and approved the use of forced labor, the
court construed the forced labor allegations as acts of slave trading.
Consequently, the court subjected Unocal to alien tort liability without
requiring proof of state action.
263. Compare id. at 890-92 (finding the state action requirement satisfied if govern-
ment entities either acted as agents of the MNC, engaged in joint commercial ventures
with the MNC, or conspired with the MNC to commit violations of international law in
furtherance of commercial interests), with Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F.
Supp. 362, 378-80 (E.D. La. 1997) (holding that allegations of a "close link" between the
MNC and host-government were insufficient to satisfy the state action requirement, de-
spite the MNC's "vast and draconian control" over the region, because the complaint
failed to allege the precise role played by the host-government's military troops in the al-
leged conduct).
264. See Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 890-92.
265. See id. at 891.
266. See id.
267. See id. at 891-92.
268. See id. (construing allegations of forced labor, conduct not generally considered
to be a jus cogens violation, into allegations of slavery, an accepted jus cogens violation).
269. See id.
270. Id. (quoting Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 795 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Edwards, J., concurring)).
271. See id. at 892.
272. See id. at 891-92.
273. See id. at 892.
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2. Calling a Slave "a Slave"
Unlike Freeport-McMoRan, the Unocal court seemed less pre-
occupied with ascertaining dispositive sources of international law.274 In
fact, the reasoning of the Unocal court was analogous to Justice Story's
approach in La Jeune Eugenie.a75 Confronted with financially lucrative,
yet morally reprehensible, conduct associated with a withering, but still
tolerated, global business practice, the Unocal and La Jeune Eugenie
courts both attempted to craft a universal proscription against the chal-
276 277lenged conduct. Justice Story ignored the ubiquity of slave trading,• •27'
characterized the conduct as immoral, equated slave trading with pi-
27928
racy, and declared it a violation of the law of nations. 80 The Unocal
court similarly sought to transform SLORC's practice of using con-
scripted and uncompensated rural laborers on infrastructure projects into
slave trading to make it conform with a violation of jus cogens norms.
This legal transformation allowed the court to assert a violation of the
law of nations, despite the fact that the conduct remained lawful in
282Myanmar.
274. Compare Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 369-84 (E.D. La.
1997) (reviewing various sources of international law that might be used to state a claim),
with Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 890-92 (citing only one international document, the Vienna
Convention, and then only to define generally jus cogens norms).
275. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text (analyzing La Jeune Eugenie).
276. Compare United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 845-47 (C.C.D. Mass.
1822) (No. 15,551) (linking slave trading with slavery and piracy to find a violation of the
law of nations), with Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 891-92 (linking forced labor with slavery to
find a violation of the law of nations).
277. Cf. The Antelope, 23 U.S. 66, 78, 92-99, 120-23 (1825) (overruling implicitly La
Jeune Eugenie). The appellants in The Antelope cited La Jeune Eugenie as authority for
the proposition that slave trading was inconsistent with the law of nations. See id. at 77-78.
In return, the respondents criticized Justice Story's inquiry in La Jeune Eugenie, as to
whether slave trading violated the law of nations, as "vain and nugatory." Id. at 96. Chief
Justice Marshall, presented with the slave trading question for the first time in The Ante-
lope, acknowledged the split among the circuits and districts, and held that slave trading
"[could not] be pronounced unlawful" because Europeans and Americans engaged in
slave trading for two centuries, such conduct was therefore "sanctioned by universal as-
sent." Id. at 120-22.
278. See La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. at 846.
279. See id. at 847
280. See id. at 851.
281. See Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 890-92. For an excellent discussion of the Unocal
court's transformation of a forced labor claim into a slavery allegation, see Wells, supra
note 15 (manuscript at 15-20).
282. See id.; supra note 245 and accompanying text (discussing the government's use of
forced labor in Burma); cf The Antelope, 23 U.S. at 122. A similar transformation dis-
turbed Chief Justice Marshall in The Antelope, prompting him to observe that slave trad-
ing "must remain lawful to those who cannot be induced to relinquish it." Id. at 122.
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To accomplish the transformation from forced labor to slavery, the
court characterized the relationship between Unocal and SLORC as a
master benefiting from the services of an "overseer.""2 3  The Interna-
tional Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery2" (Slave
Trade Convention), however, defines slavery as "the status or condition
of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of
ownership are exercised."2 5 While the court did not cite the Slave Trade
Convention, it conceded that the claim failed to allege that SLORC ever
sold its citizens to Unocal.2" Hence, the court based jurisdiction over
Unocal on the corporation's knowledge of and benefit from the govern-
ment's conscription policy, not on corporate ownership of slaves.2"
The character of the contractual arrangement described in Unocaf 8 is
more consistent with conduct proscribed in two widely ratified treaties
prohibiting forced labor, neither of which the Unocal court cited.8 9 The
Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour 290 (Compulsory
Labour Convention) defines forced labor as "all work or service which is
exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and" which is
not voluntary.29' At a minimum, there exists a legal distinction between
283. See Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 892.
284. International Convention to Suppress Slave Trade and Slavery, Sept. 25, 1926, 46
Stat. 2183, 60 L.N.T.S. 253 (entered into force Mar. 9, 1927). In addition to both the
United States and Burma, 133 other states are parties to this Convention. See U.S. DEP'T
OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 446-47 (1998).
285. Id. at 2191 (emphasis added). The International Convention to Suppress Slave
Trade and Slavery further defines slave trading as "the acquisition or disposal of a person
with intent to reduce him to slavery." Id.
286. See Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 892.
287. See id. at 892, 896.
288. See supra note 250 and accompanying text (describing the contractual arrange-
ment between SLORC and Unocal).
289. See Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, opened for signature
Jul. 4, 1957, 320 U.N.T.S. 291 (entered into force by the United States Sept. 25, 1992) (ILO
No. 105); Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, June 28, 1930, 39
U.N.T.S. 55 (entered into force May 1, 1932) (ILO No. 29) [hereinafter Compulsory La-
bour Convention]. The United States is among the 139 parties to ratify the Convention
Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, but Burma is not. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
TREATIES IN FORCE 396 (1998); International Labour Organization (visited Apr. 11, 1999)
<http://www.ilo.org> (providing current ratification status for all ILO documents). Con-
versely, Burma is among the 150 nations to ratify the Compulsory Labour Convention, but
the United States is not. See International Labour Organization, supra. The Restatement
does not, however, cite forced labor as a violation of jus cogens norms. See
RESTATEMENT, supra note 143, § 702 & cmt. a (noting, however, that "human rights not
listed in this section... [might] achieve [] the status of customary,[international] law,... in
the future").
290. See Compulsory Labour Convention, supra note 289.
291. Id. at 58.
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slavery and forced labor in that forced labor may involve involuntary and
abusive conduct, but it does not involve ownership rights of other human
beings. It is the manifestation of ownership, and the underlying eco-
nomic transactions, which propel slavery into the realm of jus cogens
violations. While transforming forced labor allegations into a claim of
slave trading may be applauded as morally correct, the Unocal court's
decision to do so without reference to any relevant international instru-
ments exemplifies the ambiguity and subjectivity inherent in judicial de-
terminations of "universal" norms.294
D. Corporate Consciousness of International Human Rights Abuses in
Light of Freeport-McMoRan and Unocal
After Unocal, the criterion for applying 42 U.S.C. § 1983's "color of
law" jurisprudence remains unclear in the context of the attenuated rela-
tionship between corporations and their government partners in foreign
291joint ventures. Under the rationale expressed in both Unocal and
Freeport-McMoRan, the mere existence of a business relationship be-
tween a corporate defendant and a foreign government is insufficient to• • 296
state a claim. In Freeport-McMoRan, the corporation evaded liability
because its private security force, rather than official government forces,
allegedly committed torts on indigenous people such that there was no297 hwvr
state action. In Unocal, however, the court subjected the corporate de-
fendant to liability because the indigenous plaintiffs attributed all the al-
legations of tortious conduct to official government forces, not the cor-
poration.
292. Compare id. (defining forced labor as involuntary work or service, but not dis-
cussing ownership rights), with International Convention to Suppress Slave Trade and
Slavery, supra note 284, at 2191 (defining slavery explicitly as the ownership of another
human being).
293. Cf. RESTATEMENT, supra note 143, § 702 cmt. n (citing slavery, but not forced
labor, as a jus cogens violation); Wells, supra note 15 (manuscript at 19) ("Ultimately,
however, even if a slave essentially acts as a forced laborer, slavery cannot be conflated
with forced labor because the element of ownership is absent in forced labor.").
294. See generally supra notes 107-46 and accompanying text (discussing the judicial
process involved in finding "universal" norms).
295. See Bencivenga, supra note 20, at 5 (pointing out the numerous questions arising
from the Unocal decision); Wallance, supra note 245, at 24 (same).
296. See John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 896 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Beanal v.
Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 378-79 (E.D. La. 1997) (holding that govern-
ment mining concession and investment in business operation were insufficient to satisfy
the ATCA's state action requirement).
297. See Freeport-McMoRan, 969 F. Supp. at 369,374, 379-80.
298. See Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 896.
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Read together, Unocal and Freeport-McMoRan suggest that the
ATCA permits U.S.-based MNCs to engage in tortious conduct abroad
so long as it does not involve the direct participation of foreign troops.2 9
This judicial interpretation of the ATCA allows MNCs to evade ac-
countability for the conduct of their private security forces,3°° while ex-
posing them to liability for the exclusive conduct of military forces com-
manded by their immunized government partners. 1 In other words,
American courts will permit U.S.-based MNCs to finance human rights
abuses as long as nominally private agents, not uniformed foreign mili-
tary forces, perpetrate them.3°2 Such an outcome is both unprincipled
and inconsistent with the purpose of the ATCA. °3
Comparing Freeport-McMoRan and Unocal further suggests that 42
U.S.C. § 1983's constitutional standards may be inappropriate for adjudi-
cating cases arising out of economic globalization.3°4 Both cases involved
foreign direct investment in which military dictatorships attracted MNCs
with cost-reducing incentives derived from exploiting the labor and envi-
• . 305
ronment of indigenous populations. Under Freeport-McMoRan's for-
299. Compare id. (holding that corporation could be liable if it knew of and benefited
from human rights abuses committed solely by host-government troops), with Freeport-
McMoRan, 969 F. Supp. at 380 (dismissing claim because plaintiff failed to allege what
role the host-government's military troops played in assisting private paramilitary security
personnel in committing human rights abuses).
300. See supra notes 220-39 and accompanying text (criticizing the Freeport-McMoRan
court's formalistic state action analysis).
301. See supra notes 262-73 and accompanying text (discussing the Unocal court's
functional approach to state action analysis).
302. Cf Freeport-McMoRan, 969 F. Supp. at 378, 380 (dismissing ATCA claim against
MNC because, inter alia, plaintiff failed to allege whether host-government military troops
helped enforce corporate policy or "merely observed" corporate paramilitary forces en-
gage in violative conduct).
303. See supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text (discussing competing theories of
the purpose of the ATCA).
304. Cf. Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 890 (commenting on the inconsistency of § 1983 juris-
prudence); Freeport-McMoRan, 969 F. Supp. at 380 (analyzing state action under four
tests and finding that, despite long-term, mutually beneficial contractual and economic
relations between the host-government and defendant-corporation, plaintiff's failure to
allege the specific role played by foreign military forces undermined the ATCA claim).
305. See Milton R. Moskowitz, Company Performance Roundup, 98 BUs. & SoC'Y
REV. 55, 61-62 (1997) (discussing the benefits to Unocal resulting from its relationship
with SLORC); John Pilger, The Burmese Gulag, COVERT ACTION QUARTERLY (visited
Aug. 20, 1998) <http://caq.com/CAQ58burmese.html> (same); US Mining, supra note 198,
at 91-96 (discussing the relationship between Freeport and the Indonesian Government).
But see MARBER, supra note 1, at 97 (asserting that criticism of a government's choice to
allow, or an MNC's decision to employ, cheap labor is both short cited and naive). Mar-
ber theorizes that by exploiting indigenous labor to attract investment, emerging nations
will be able to industrialize sufficiently to abandon such practices. See id.
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malistic approach, the relationship between the parties was not interde-
pendent enough to predicate liability by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 standards.3 6
Thus, the court did not find state action based on allegations that the
host-government conferred contractual rights for resource extraction,
significantly invested in the ensuing project, and maintained an on-site
military presence.3 7 In contrast, the Unocal court allowed for liability
because the corporate defendant contracted for the services, not merely
the property rights, which resulted in the challenged conduct.3 8 This
formulation suggests that a sufficiently vague contractual arrangement
will mitigate liability, regardless of the real-world physical and financial
relationship between the MNC and the host-government.
Thus, after Unocal, an MNC may be liable if it knows of, or economi-
cally benefits from, human rights abuses perpetrated by a foreign host-
government on its own citizens in the course of a joint venture project.3"
The contours of liability, however, remain general and uncertain.310
Open questions for future courts include how direct the benefit must be
for liability to attach, and what degree of knowledge the corporation
must possess to be culpable.3" Under the current statutory scheme, these
issues, along with defining what conduct amounts to a violation of the
law of nations, must be resolved judicially, on a case-by-case basis.3 2
Therefore, while Unocal may ultimately yield a measure of justice for
impoverished Burmese farmers, the decision offers minimal guidance for
global corporate conduct.
313
E. Next on the Docket: Taking A Crack at Shell and Chevron
1. Oil, Guns, and Money: Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.314
In 1996, the family of Nigerian activist Ken Saro-Wiwa sued Shell
306. See Freeport-McMoRan, 969 F. Supp. at 378-79 (holding that the complaint failed
to satisfy the symbiotic relationship test).
307. See id. (holding that the allegations failed to make out a claim under either the
symbiotic relationship or joint action tests).
308. See Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 892 (finding a contractual arrangement for labor and
security services coupled with a knowledge of and payment for abusive practices sufficient
to establish liability).
309. See id.
310. See Pizzurro & Delaney, supra note 22.
311. See id.
312. Cf. Wallance, supra note 245, at 25 (arguing that Congress, not the courts, should
articulate the parameters of ATCA liability).
313. See id.
314. No. 96 Civ. 8386 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 1998).
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Oil,3 ' alleging that the corporation was complicit in the Nigerian military
regime's execution of Saro-Wiwa and several other members of the
Ogoni tribe.31 6 Saro-Wiwa led protests against Shell's practices in Nige-
ria, which included devastating pollution and systematic corruption.31' In
retaliation against Saro-Wiwa's demands that his Ogoni people receive a
greater share of the oil revenues and that Shell clean up its environ-
mental damage, the corporation allegedly financed numerous police at-
tacks on Ogoni villages.1 8 The Nigerian government subsequently ar-
rested Saro-Wiwa." 9 Thereafter, Shell refused to use its influence with
the government to obtain clemency for Saro-Wiwa unless he agreed to
320call off the campaign to discredit the company. Shortly thereafter, Ni-
geria executed Saro-Wiwa by hanging hi321
While the district court dismissed the claim on forum non conveniens
grounds,"' the complaint alleged that Shell, like Unocal in Myanmar,
knew of and benefited from human rights abuses committed by its for-
eign host-government. 2 ' Shell has admitted to buying weapons and vehi-
cles for the Nigerian police force, although it "defend[ed] its actions as
the common practice of a 'wide range of companies in Nigeria, who em-
ploy the police to guard their facilities.' 3 24 In addition, plaintiffs accused
315. See id., slip op. at 2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 1998).
316. See id.; Ariadne K. Sacharoff, Note, Multinationals in Host Countries: Can They
Be Held Liable Under the Alien Tort Claims Act for Human Rights Violations?, 23
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 927, 958-64 (1998) (discussing the events leading up to the filing of
Wiwa).
317. See Wiwa, slip. op. at 2; Sacharoff, supra note 316, at 958-60.
318. See Sacharoff, supra note 316, at 960-61.
319. See id. at 961-62.
320. See Andy Rowell, Sleeping With the Enemy: Worldwide Protests Can't Stop Shell
Snuggling Up to Nigeria's Military, VILLAGE VOICE, Jan. 23, 1996, at 23 (reporting the
account given by Dr. Owens Wiwa, Ken Saro-Wiwa's brother, regarding secret meetings
with Brian Anderson, the head of Shell Nigeria).
321. See id.
322. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 Civ. 8386, slip op. at 12-16
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 1998). Plaintiff has filed a motion for reconsideration in light of Jota v.
Texaco Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 159 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding error in dismissal of ATCA case
against Texaco alleging environmental damage in Ecuador because the lower court had
not required the corporate defendant to submit to jurisdiction in Ecuador). Telephone
Interview with Professor Julie Shapiro, counsel for the Center of Constitutional Rights
(Jan. 29, 1999).
323. Compare Wiwa, slip op. at 2 (alleging that corporate defendant conspired with the
Nigerian government in committing numerous human rights violations), with John Doe I
v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 885 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (alleging that the corporate defen-
dants "were aware of and benefited from" human rights abuse committed by agents of the
Burmese government).
324. Matthew Yeomans, Oil, Guns, And Lies, VILLAGE VOICE, Feb. 20, 1996, at 26.
Shell has since appointed a new managing director and adopted a new corporate philoso-
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Shell of playing a role in bribing prosecution witnesses at Saro-Wiwa's
trial. 25 Thus, the Wiwa case seems to implicate knowledge of human
rights abuses that is more direct than in Unocal,"' and more financially
interdependent than in Freeport-McMoRan.327 Moreover, Shell's asser-
tion that the practice of arming government soldiers to protect company
facilities is a widespread corporate practice in Nigeria 11 supports new al-
legations recently made against Chevron that may result in an ATCA
claim.329
2. Same Story, Different Stripe: The Case against Chevron
In May 1998, unarmed Nigerian protesters occupied an offshore oil rig
owned by Chevron.33 The protesters allege that they were negotiating
with "Chevron's representative over reparations for environmental dam-
age" when the corporation called in the Nigerian military and police
332forces.331 The armed forces killed two protesters and injured others.
The families of those killed and injured are contemplating suing Chev-
ron in federal court under the ATCA, alleging that the corporation ar-
ranged the attack and paid Nigerian forces a customary "special duty
pay" for their activities.333 Chevron denies the allegations stating that
"[a]s a matter of Chevron corporate policy, we would not pay any law en-
phy of profits and principles. See supra note 2 (discussing Shell's recent efforts in the area
of corporate social responsibility).
325. See Sacharoff, supra note 316, at 963; see also Rowell, supra note 320, at 23 (re-
porting on allegations that Shell representatives supported attempts to bribe witnesses and
were present when government agents made such bribes). The head of Shell Nigeria has
been quoted as admitting that the company has fallen into "a 'black hole of corruption,'
which is 'acting like a gravity that is pulling us down all the time."' Id.
326. Compare supra notes 315-25 and accompanying text (describing allegations of
direct corporate participation in bribery and conspiracy), with Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 896
(alleging mere knowledge of, and payment for, abusive services rather than actual corpo-
rate participation in, and presence during, tortious conduct).
327. Compare Rowell, supra note 320, at 23 (describing allegations of direct corporate
funding for bribery and logistical support for the Nigerian military), with Beanal v.
Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 378-79 (E.D. La. 1997) (alleging a government
mining concession and investment, but not direct corporate funding of the military).
328. See Yeomans, supra note 324.
329. See McAuley, supra note 20 (reporting on potential ATCA suit against Chevron);
Drilling and Killing: Chevron and Nigeria's Oil Dictatorship (Pacifica Network radio
broadcast, Sept. 30, 1998), transcript available at <http://www.pacifica.org/programs/nigeria
/printing.html> (interviewing numerous witnesses to, and participants in, Shell's Nigerian
operations).
330. See McAuley, supra note 20.
331. Id.
332. See id.
333. See id.
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forcement agency representative. 334 At this writing, the potential plain-
tiffs have yet to file suit.
The Chevron incident, like the events described in Freeport-
McMoRan, Unocal, and Wiwa, is one of a growing number of conflicts
between indigenous groups and energy companies.3 The Unocal deci-
sion has opened U.S. federal courts to resolving these disputes, or at least
to assigning liability."' Nevertheless, the scope of the antiquated ATCA,
as discerned from a single statutory sentence and its relatively minimal
and inconsistent jurisprudence, remains remarkably ill-defined and un-
suited for modern transnational human rights litigation.
III. VIRTUE IS ITS OWN REWARD: AMENDING THE ALIEN TORT
CLAIMS ACT TO PROVIDE A REMEDY FOR CORPORATE COMPLICITY IN
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
A. When Fictions Collide: Universal Norms and Multinational
Corporations
Universal norms are a legal fiction.337 It is unrealistic to expect "over
160 different countries with different cultures, political systems, and ide-
ologies, and at different stages of economic development" to reach a
consensus on what rights should be protected by rules of international
118law. Moreover, the political and economic factors that influence one
nation's willingness to require another nation to comply with human
rights norms generally undermine effective state enforcement.3 9 The use
334. Id. (quoting Michael Libby, spokesman for Chevron). Pacifica Radio Network
broadcast a news program on September 30,1998, however, quoting the contractor on the
rig as saying that Chevron paid and supplied the naval officers who took part in the raid.
See id.
335. See Yerton, supra note 21.
336. See Pizzurro & Delaney, supra note 22 (concluding that Unocal creates a new le-
gal peril for MNCs doing business with foreign regimes).
337. Cf. GUIDE, supra note 55, at 14-16 (highlighting the differences in perspective
emerging between Western developed nations that emphasize civil and political rights, and
developing countries that are focused on economic and social rights); HUNTINGTON, supra
note 17, at 183, 192-98, 310 (arguing that Western efforts at promoting a universal Western
culture is the central problem affecting "intercivilizational" relationships and that univer-
sality is false, immoral, and dangerous); JANIS, supra note 11, at 7 (observing that the
complexity and diversity of the international legal process "verge[s] on anarchy" and "of-
ten seem[s] to defy the very idea of any international legal 'system' at all").
338. GUIDE, supra note 55, at 14-15. While certain widely-ratified treaties may impose
sanctions on government officials who violate a narrow range of human rights, "the
United States has a singularly poor record of ratifying [major] human rights treaties." Id.
at 18 nn.1, 3.
339. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 17, at 192-98, 226-29 (discussing political and eco-
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of so-called "universal norms" thus holds Western values captive for sev-
eral reasons.14 First, state practices crucial to finding universal norms are
both diverse and divisive . 4  Whatever economic connections exist be-
tween foreign and American societies, emerging nations in the East and
developed nations in the West do not adhere to each other's legal and
moral values.342 It is precisely these cultural differences underlying di-
vergent state practices that draw corporations and foreign host-
governments together causing human rights and environmental abuses
for the sake of profit.343 Second, judges find universal norms by subjec-
tively weighing evidence of state practice from myriad non-binding
sources whose precedence and value as precedent is, at least, debat-
344able. Just because one judge finds that particular conduct violates so-called universal norms, there is no guarantee that another judge will
nomic factors affecting the United States' ability to influence the human rights policies of
Asian nations). For example, the growing economic strength of Asian countries has re-
duced the importance of foreign aid as a source of hard currency, thereby decreasing the
influence of Western governments that once supplied such aid. See id. at 194-95. Like-
wise, the regional members of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) were
unwilling to pressure Burma to stop human rights violations and, instead, welcomed
SLORC's military junta into their fold. See id.; see also Hiatt, supra note 195, at C7.
Myanmar's foreign minister, Ohn Gyaw, lauding his nation's arrival at ASEAN, similarly
dismissed Western efforts to discourage child labor and corruption. See id. Gyaw claimed
that Myanmar "respects 'the norms and ideals of human rights .... But like in any other
country in Southeast Asia, we have to take into consideration our culture, our history, our
ethos .... What is good in other countries cannot be good in our country."' Id.
340. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 17, at 308-12 (describing political and foreign pol-
icy implications of false universalism).
341. See JANIS, supra note 11, at 52-54 (admitting that customary "international law is
subject to a number of sometimes crippling faults").
342. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 17, at 71-72 (arguing "that 'the values that are most
important in the West are least important worldwide,"' particularly Western emphasis on
individualism); see also Paul Blustein, Gore Remarks Anger Malaysian Leaders, WASH.
POST, Nov. 17, 1998, at A29 (reporting that Vice President Gore's remarks supporting
pro-democracy forces in Malaysia "provoked a furious response" from Asian leaders be-
cause of the tension between so-called "Asian values" and Western democratic ideals).
343. See MARBER, supra note 1, at 95-104. Mr. Marber argues that emerging nations
can and should use their unregulated economies to gain a "comparative advantage" over
Western nations. See id. at 97. He contends further that the public should not "give in to
the demands of labor and human rights activists campaigning for international labor stan-
dards" because to do so would jeopardize the chance that developing countries would join
more "advanced markets." Id. 208-09; see also HUNTINGTON, supra note 17, at 226-28
(observing that economic and industrial conflicts between Asia and the United States
arose out of cultural differences). Professor Huntington argues that Western attempts to
promote human rights in the East have met with only limited success because growing
economic strength in Asia is resulting in rising cultural assertiveness that is challenging
Western policies and values. See id. 192-98.
344. See JANIS, supra note 11, at 53 (noting that ascertaining norms of customary in-
ternational law is a subjective process, "and subjective scales tilt differently in different
hands").
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subjectively agree.3 4 ' Finally, the mere fact that so many emerging na-
tions seem to engage in abusive practices suggests the banality of anyS 346
universal standard.
Corporations, likewise, are a legal fiction.347 In 1819, Justice Marshall
observed that "[a] corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible,
and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of
law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation
confers upon it. 3 48 Today's MNCs are not paper tigers, however, and
powerful corporations in the global economy are both transcending and
transforming the nations that spawned them.349
The collision of these two legal fictions in ATCA litigation gives rise to
the notion that the United States government has little or no interest in
how its own corporations treat foreign citizens abroad. Reliance on
subjective universal norms, rather than concrete domestic regulations, to
create subject matter jurisdiction in ATCA claims arises out of the pre-
sumption against extraterritorial application of United States law.351 Re-
spect for foreign sovereignty.. and an apparent desire to promote U.S.
corporate competitiveness in the global market underlies this presump-
345. See id.; see also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 812 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (panel of three judges dismissing case but disagreeing significantly on rationale); su-
pra note 110 (discussing the various perspectives of the Tel-Oren panel).
346. See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text (observing that this was essentially
Justice Marshall's position regarding slave trading in The Antelope).
347. See infra note 348 and accompanying text.
348. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819)
(Marshall, J.). More recently, the Seventh Circuit noted that "[t]he corporation is just a
convenient name for a complex web of contracts among managers, workers, and suppliers
of equity and debt capital." Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1427
(7th Cir. 1985).
349. Compare generally KORTEN, supra note 1, at 11, with MARBER, supra note 1, at
213. Mr. Korten makes a lucid and compelling argument that the social and political ten-
sion arising out of corporate pursuit of accelerated economic growth is destroying both the
social and ecological "fabric that sustains [the] human community." KORTEN, supra note
1, at 11. Mr. Marber agrees that corporations are part of the world's economic transfor-
mation, but argues that economic opportunities flowing from accelerated global economic
interdependence will provide benefits for all nations. See MARBER, supra note 1, at 213.
350. Cf. Gibney & Emerick, supra note 9, at 134 (arguing against U.S. laws permitting
"American corporation[s] operating overseas to systematically discriminate against native
workers... in a variety of ways").
351. Cf id. at 141-45 (analyzing the underlying premises of extraterritorial application
of U.S. law, and concluding that courts should place more reliance on the nationality prin-
ciple of extraterritorial jurisdiction as a means of utilizing domestic law to regulate U.S.
corporations operating overseas).
352. Cf. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421-24 (1964) ("While
historic notions of sovereign authority do bear upon the wisdom of employing the act of
state doctrine, they do not dictate its existence.").
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tion against extra-territoriality.353 Abusive foreign regimes, however,
have seized on this double standard in American law to lure corporate
investment and tighten their grip on power at the expense of their own
people.14 By conspiring with host-governments to profit from unethical
practices overseas that would be illegal if carried out at home, MNCs
evade accountability for their complicity in human rights abuses.5
B. The Need for Legislation
1. Congress Can and Should Amend the A TCA
Congress should not permit private U.S. MNCs, as mere creatures of
our domestic law, to escape liability for their egregious extraterritorial
human rights violations simply because prevailing norms abroad differ
from our own."' "Congress has the authority to enforce its laws beyond
the territorial boundaries of the United States, 357 and has done so in the
areas of antitrust358 and securities. In response to the moral outrage
over revelations of widespread international corruption involving the
overseas activities of leading U.S. MNCs, Congress passed the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977360 prohibiting foreign bribery. 6' Faced
with similar moral outrage over corporate human rights abuses overseas,
the time has come to enact legislation designed to cure these corporate
353. See Gibney & Emerick, supra note 9, at 144-45.
354. See id. at 136-37.
355. See id. at 133, 144-45; see also discussion supra Part II (analyzing the disposition
of several recent ATCA cases alleging multinational corporate complicity in human rights
abuses).
356. See Gibney & Emerick, supra note 9, at 142-145.
357. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,248 (1991).
358. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993) (holding that the
Sherman Act applies to wholly foreign conduct if the defendant intended the conduct to
produce, and it did produce, "some substantial effect" within the United States); United
States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 2, 9 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that price fixing
that occurred entirely in Japan was subject to criminal prosecution under United States
antitrust laws because the acts were intended to, and did, have a "substantial effect" in the
United States). For a critical analysis of the "effects" test applied in Hartford Fire and
Nippon Paper, see Gibney & Emerick, supra note 9, at 140-145.
359. See Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421, 424-25 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that
acts in furtherance of fraudulent transactions are sufficient to support jurisdiction against
foreigners under the Securities and Exchange Act as long as "at least some activity de-
signed to further the fraud scheme" occured in the United States).
360. Pub. L. No. 95-213, §§ 102-04, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd, 78dd-l,
78dd-2 (1994)).
361. See id.; S. REP. No. 95-114, at 4 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098,
4101. Treasury Secretary Blumenthal testified regarding the moral sanctions against brib-
ery. See id.
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practices.
The United States need not wait for foreign nations to accept respon-
sibility for regulating the human rights activities of those doing business
within their borders. Instead, the United States must take the initiative
and seek to deter human rights abuses committed overseas by its own
corporate creations. Several states and municipalities have already taken
the first step by adopting selective purchasing ordinances and banning
contracts with firms doing business in Myanmar.362 Furthermore, non-
governmental organizations are pursuing consumer and shareholder
education,"' in addition to more radical measures such as corporate char-
ter revocation. 364 Grassroots activism promotes public debate on the is-
sue of corporate social responsibility, however, it offers no remedy to
those harmed by abusive MNC practices.
Legislatively modernizing the ATCA will enhance both the rights of
corporations and the remedies available to alien victims of human rights
abuses abroad. The current practice of crafting standards of conduct
case-by-case, in a piecemeal fashion, without statutory guidelines, creates
unnecessary financial risks for MNCs and may erode their competitive
365edge abroad. Moreover, inconsistent judicial interpretations of the
362. See Organization for International Investment, State and Municipal Sanctions Re-
port (visited Feb. 23, 1999) <http:// www.ofii.org/issues/sanction.html> (noting municipali-
ties that have directed purchasing ordinances at Burma, Cuba, Indonesia, Nigeria, Swit-
zerland, and Tibet). At least one court, however, has found that such an ordinance
impermissibly encroaches on the federal power to regulate foreign affairs. See National
Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, No. 97 12042 (D.C. Mass. Nov. 4, 1998), available at
<http://www.usaengage.org/background/lawsuit/NFTCruling.html> (holding that Massa-
chusetts's Burma Law unconstitutionally violates the federal foreign affairs power and,
thus, not reaching a Commerce Clause or preemption analysis) (on file with the Catholic
University Law Review); see also Fred Hiatt, Editorial, Massachusetts Takes on Burma,
WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 1999, at B7 (characterizing the dispute over selective purchasing
laws as "local sovereignty vs. an international rule of law," and describing the complex in-
ternal dispute within the Clinton Administration in balancing trade policy with human
rights).
363. See Corporations and Human Rights, supra note 2 (reviewing initiatives taken in
1996 by non-governmental organizations to improve corporate social responsibility).
364. See Wells, supra note 15 (manuscript at 2-4 n.7); Mary Hood & Nick Penniman,
Environmental, Human Rights and Women's Groups Petition California Attorney General
to Revoke UNOCAL's Charter (visited Feb. 23, 1999) <http://www.igc.org/igc/en/hg/
unocal.html> (discussing a brief filed by 30 citizens' groups and individuals seeking to re-
voke Unocal's state charter because of numerous human rights and environmental viola-
tions at home and abroad).
365. See Bencivenga, supra note 20 (reporting that Unocal's general counsel believes
that the ATCA suit against his company could have a "chilling effect" on foreign invest-
ment because it would nullify even the best due diligence efforts); Yerton, supra note 21
(discussing potential corporate liability and quoting the Freeport-McMoRan chairman as
saying "[If Unocal is held liable, then n]o American company (could) sign a contract of
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ATCA's threshold requirements have led to both unprincipled and unan-
ticipated results, making it difficult for MNCs to ascertain precisely what
conduct the nation expects them to conform to abroad."' Likewise, in
the absence of precise statutory language, human rights advocates ex-
pend their scarce resources attempting to imbue a single sentence in an
ancient and obscure statute with more meaning than its drafters ever
meant to convey." 7 The fact that the phrase "tort ... in violation of the
law of nations" eludes clear meaning in modern law368 is a poor excuse,
however, for failing to hold MNCs accountable for their role in human
rights abuses overseas.
2. Filartiga Resulted in ATCA Legislation and Unocal Should Too
Congress should reinforce and expand the ATCA as it has done in the
past.369 In 1992, Congress responded to the Filartiga case by enacting the
Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA).37° The TVPA defined specific
causes of action for torture and extra-judicial killing in recognition of the
United States' international obligation "to provide means of civil redress
to victims of torture. 3 71 In preparing the TVPA, the House Report
work in China" because "[t]hose activists would be on you as soon as the ink dries.").
366. See Bencivenga, supra note 20 (describing corporate concerns over the open
questions regarding degree of knowledge, extent of benefit, and types of relationships that
might lead to corporate liability for human rights abuses after Unocal); Pizzurro & De-
laney, supra note 22 (same). For a comprehensive analysis of the potential liability and
litigation implications of the Unocal decision for American companies doing business
overseas, see generally Lucien J. Dhooge, A Close Shave in Burma: Unocal Corporation
and Private Enterprise Liability for Human Rights Violations, 24 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM.
REG. 1 (1998). Professor Dhooge concludes that "[t]his new era [heralded by the Unocal
decision] ... is fraught with peril for American businesses." Id. at 66.
367. Cf. STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 22, at 49-50 (noting that the open-ended
language of the ATCA has led to extensive debate and that courts will not necessarily rely
unquestionably on the growing body of precedent).
368. See id. at 50 (observing that "[t]he language employed by the ATCA ... has no
clearly recognized definition in modern law").
369. See, e.g., Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note) (1994); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d
774, 823, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Robb, S.J., concurring). In Tel-Oren, Senior Circuit Judge
Robb argued that "[c]ourts ought not to serve as debating clubs for professors willing to
argue over what is or what is not an accepted violation of the law of nations." Id. at 827.
Instead of consigning "broad and novel questions" surrounding the definition of the law of
nations to academic and judicial speculations, Senior Circuit Judge Robb urged that Con-
gress and the President should first determine if the issue is proper for judicial inquiry, and
if so, "then provide the courts with the guidelines by which such inquiries should proceed."
Id.
370. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (1994). For a thorough discussion of the origin,
strengths, and weaknesses of the TVPA, see generally STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note
22, at 25-29.
371. H.R. REP. No. 102-367, pt. 1, at 3 (1991).
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commented that "universal principles provide scant comfort ... to the
many thousands of victims of torture and summary executions around
the world., 372 The House of Representatives observed that "[d]espite
universal condemnation of these abuses, many of the world's govern-
ments still engage in" human rights violations and that international
standards forbidding such conduct are "[t]oo often ... honored in the
breach. 3 73 The facts of Unocal, Freeport-McMoRan, and Wiwa suggest
that corporate collusion with foreign governments, to reduce costs and
increase profits at the expense of human rights, demand a similar con-
374gressional response.
Corporate complicity in human rights abuses will only abate under the
pressure of enforcement and liability.75 Moreover, the case law makes
372. Id.
373. Id.; cf. Annan, supra note 16, at A15 (observing that "[w]ithout the private sec-
tor's active commitment and support, there is a danger that universal values will remain
little more than fine words-documents whose anniversaries we can celebrate and make
speeches about but with limited impact on the lives of ordinary people.").
374. Cf. Wallance, supra note 245. Mr. Wallance agrees with the spirit of the Unocal
ruling, that companies doing business with "hellish" governments should not avoid re-
sponsibility when they knowingly benefit from the host-government's "abhorrent acts."
Id. He argues, however, that such a doctrine should be embodied in coherent statutory
standards rather than evolving case-by-case through judicial fiat. See id.
Formulating a comprehensive transnational code of conduct for U.S.-based corporations
or selecting which of the myriad federal commercial laws will have extraterritorial applica-
tion for purposes of ATCA litigation is beyond the scope of this Comment. This Com-
ment proposes, however, that any legislative framework should define clearly the scope
and limits of corporate ATCA liability. To this end, section 702(a)-(f) of the Restatement
provides a plausible range of defined conduct suitable for this purpose. See
RESTATEMENT, supra note 143, at § 702(a)-(f) (including genocide, slavery, murder and
causing disappearance, torture, prolonged arbitrary detention, and systematic racial dis-
crimination as violations of the law of nations). Congress should augment any legislation
modeled after § 702, however, to include, at a minimum, gross environmental damage in-
flicted on indigenous peoples. See supra note 211 (citing literature supporting the proposi-
tion that severe environmental damage should be actionable under ATCA, particularly
when it effects indigenous peoples). Corporations should be liable for damages to any in-
dividual subjected to the actionable conduct. Legislation should also provide guidance for
class action and third party suits. Further, Congress should eliminate the judicially-
imposed state action requirement by providing that a corporate entity need not act under
actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any nation to be liable for damages. Con-
gress could adopt provisions addressing exhaustion of remedies, statute of limitations, and
equitable tolling from the TVPA. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (1994). Finally, any corporate
human rights abuse statute should include a clear statement providing for retroactive ap-
plication. Cf STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 22, at 155-59 (arguing that retroactive
application of the TVPA is consistent with the exceptions to the presumption against ret-
roactive application set forth in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994)).
375. Cf. supra notes 14-25 and accompanying text (noting that human rights advocates
turned to civil lawsuits against corporate ATCA defendants because other means of com-
pelling responsible corporate human rights policies were ineffective).
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clear that redress for victims depends on the articulation of clear and
specific rights and duties pertinent to corporate social responsibility.376
Legal language in this context carries a ponderous burden because an
amended ATCA may influence matters of life and death, as well as bil-
lions of dollars of investment and profit.377 For this reason, precise and
detailed legislative pronouncements of the nation's ethical expectations
of MNCs, rather than inconsistent and contradictory judicial debate, will
better serve both the boardroom and the global village.378
The argument by opponents of an amended ATCA, that it will open a
floodgate of litigation and constrain global investment, is without merit
because most corporations will probably avoid doing business in places
where the worst human rights abuses occur.3 79 This is because unstable
governments are likely to deter most investors, particularly when the rest
of the world offers profitable and relatively safer ventures.' 8 Contractual
security arrangements, express or implied, that might lead to ATCA li-
ability are, therefore, uncommon because they are only needed in unsta-
ble high risk venues like Burma and Nigeria. Thus, Congress need only
tailor the ATCA to address a narrow range of social irresponsibility
arising out of unethical and unnecessary corporate practices.
Voluntary corporate codes of conduct provide a sound basis for devel-
oping an amended ATCA that is responsive to corporate social responsi-
bility." ' Working together with responsible corporations and human
rights advocates, Congress should ensure that an amended ATCA would
be either a catalyst for improvement of multinational corporate govern-
ance or a potent means of redress for victims of heedless corporate ac-
tors.
376. See discussion supra Part II (analyzing recent corporate ATCA cases and the ju-
dicial search for clear universal norms in a diverse, globalized economy).
377. See generally MARBER, supra note 1, at 96 (estimating that investments in manu-
facturing in developing nations would grow to almost $90 billion in 1997).
378. See Wallance, supra note 245 (arguing that legislation, not adjudication, is needed
to clarify corporate social responsibility). But cf. Symposium, Can Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility Be Legislated?, 96 Bus. & Soc'Y REV. 4-10 (1996) (surveying the views of
various business leaders generally opposed to proposed legislation designed to compel
corporations to act more responsibly towards employees and communities).
379. See E-mail from Stuart Solsky, Partner in the Project Finance and Infrastructure
Group in the New York Office of Kelley, Drye & Warren, LLP, to the author (Sep. 3,
1998) (on file with the Catholic University Law Review).
380. See id.
381. See Wells, supra note 15 (manuscript at 4, 38-44) (discussing in detail voluntary
corporate codes and arguing that the Unocal decision is consistent with the most conserva-
tive multinational practices and initiatives).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The corporate ATCA cases are just the tip of the iceberg of evidence
demonstrating the significant impact of business and trade in perpetuat-
ing human rights violations in those countries where such abuses are
most prevalent. 3s' Whatever economic connections might exist between
foreign and American societies, emerging nations in the East and devel-
oped nations in the West do not adhere to the same legal and moral val-
ues. The concept of evolving universal norms is, therefore, a legal fiction
manipulated by MNCs to evade accountability for unethical overseas in-
vestment activities and finessed by human rights advocates seeking
remedies for indigenous victims of corporate abuses. The consequent
struggle to define "a tort ... in violation of the law of nations"3"3 benefits
no one.
In the multicultural, boundaryless, and privatized world of emerging
markets, the co-existence of economic prosperity and human rights in-
creasingly depends on ethical business management.384 While the bor-
derless capitalism that gave rise to MNCs created a powerful economic
engine," the consequence of unregulated global commerce yields indif-
382. See, e.g., Judith Matloff, Oil-or Rights-in Central Asia?, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Jan. 15, 1999, at 6 (reporting that the United States Government was over-
looking human rights violations by the Government of Kazakstan in order to preserve lu-
crative investments by American oil executives engaged in pipeline and oil field develop-
ment in the Caspian Sea); Russell Mokhiber & Robert Weissman, Beat the Devil: The 10
Worst Corporations of 1997, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, Dec. 1997, at 9-18 (detailing the
"worst" in global corporate social irresponsibility during 1997); Michael Shari, What Did
Mobil Know?, Bus. WK., Dec. 28, 1998, at 68-74 (reporting on allegations that Mobil Oil
Indonesia, a wholly owned subsidiary of American based Mobil, assisted the Indonesian
army in suppressing a guerrilla movement by providing logistic support for state sponsored
torture and the digging of mass graves); Kalpana Sharma, 'Enron Violating Human
Rights', THE HINDU, Jan. 25, 1999, at 14, available at <http://webpage.com/hindu/daily
1990125/02/02250008.htm> (reporting that an Indian power corporation, owned in part by
a United States energy conglomerate, used corporate security forces to harass demonstra-
tors, and benefited from human rights violations committed by local police suppressing
dissent); Vidal, supra note 4 (commenting on the destabilizing effects of the oil industry in
poor nations, and predicting that the increasing political turbulence in the Caspian region
makes that area ripe for corporate involvement in human rights and environmental con-
flicts).
383. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
384. See Annan, supra note 16, at A15 (discussing the link between open markets,
economic prosperity, and global corporate support for "core values in the areas of human
rights, labor standards, and environmental practices").
385. See generally KORTEN, supra note 1 (criticizing economic globalization as under-
mining democracy and destroying the environment); MARBER, supra note 1 (approving of
relatively unbridled economic corporate globalization as a means for promoting the eco-
nomic prosperity of both emerging and developing nations); Manning, supra note 191 (dis-
cussing the effects of globalism on corporate economics).
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ferent, and often deliberately cruel, results for the indigenous people of
developing countries. Too often, these results occur with the knowledge
and approval of U.S. chartered corporations. Thus, where American
corporate social responsibility is concerned, the sovereign, not the mar-
ket, must rule. Just as Congress legislated standards to prevent foreign
corrupt practices, it should similarly amend the ATCA to legislate corpo-
rate human rights standards. By establishing clear guidelines and liabil-
ity for overseas investment, Congress can best promote corporate efforts
at sustainable development in emerging nations, while meeting the
United States' obligations as a leader in the world community.
